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Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
During the last decennia we witnessed an increasing complexity of products in the
ﬁnancial markets. This led ﬁnancial institutions to rely more and more on the use
of quantitative models. Besides the growth in complexity we also saw a spectac-
ular growth in trading, especially in derivative instruments, that continues in the
new millennium. For example, the turnover of exchange-traded ﬁnancial derivatives
at the end of 2002 is estimated about $ 170 trillion and the notional amount of
outstanding OTC contracts is estimated about $ 128 trillion (see Jeanneau (2002)).
The growing complexity and trading size of the ﬁnancial markets makes the task
for ﬁnancial regulators more diﬃcult and important. An important part of banks’
portfolios these days consists of derivative securities whose value can depend on
some traditional underlyings such as stocks, bonds, and currencies or some more ex-
otic underlyings such as volatility and credit. One of the most apparent diﬀerences
between trading derivatives and fundamental securities, like stocks and bonds, is the
importance of theoretical valuation and hedging models in derivatives markets. For
example, these models are used for predicting the behavior of the term structure
of interest rates, modeling the dynamics of assets underlying derivative contracts,
the volatility surface of option prices, determining the most appropriate hedge in-
struments, etc. This induces a somewhat new type of risk, model risk.M o d e lr i s k
manifests itself, for instance, when a delta hedge for a put or call option on a stock in-
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dex is based on a Black-Scholes (lognormal) model with a certain volatility, whereas
the index in fact follows a lognormal process with a diﬀerent volatility. When the
assumed value of the volatility is less than the actual value, the party that is writing
the option will not only suﬀer a loss from quoting a too low price but will also be
subject to a variance resulting from mishedging. When the volatility is overesti-
mated the writer may in a competitive market not be able to sell the option at the
high price that correspond to the overestimated volatility; even when the option is
sold, there is still a mishedging risk. Potentially more severe cases of model risk
may be envisaged as well, such as when the true process does not follow a lognormal
process but rather one that has heavier tails or is time-dependent.
Derivatives practitioners are well aware of the fact that their models are not
entirely correct and try to adjust the models to market conditions. For example,
having to deal with the constant volatility assumption in the Black-Scholes model,
while knowing very well that the true value of volatility is uncertain, traders often
use implied volatilities as model input. Usually there are numerous options trading
on the same underlying with diﬀerent strikes resulting in multiple implied volatilities
contradicting the Black-Scholes assumption. Despite the apparent inconsistency of
the Black-Scholes model with market prices, traders continue to use it trying to
adjust it using rules of thumb based on market knowledge.
Risk managers, who are further removed from the market than traders, are
usually less capable of making these subjective corrections necessary to get the
models to work. Therefore, model risk is harder to grasp for risk managers as more
traditional sources of risk such as market risk, credit risk, legal risk, etc. A solution
is to set model reserves for trading desks. Ideally, these model reserves depend on
the market and the product traded, as some markets and/or products are more
easily reliably modeled than others.
Though most prominent in derivatives markets, model risk is certainly not re-
stricted to derivatives. Risk managers prefer to use (downside) risk measures to
estimate the risk of a portfolio (possibly, but not necessarily containing derivatives).
They employ models for describing the dynamics of the portfolios in order to com-
pute these risk measures. However, if the models they employ do not accurately
describe the underlying dynamics this results in an opaque estimate of the risk.1.2 Overview and contribution of thesis 3
The need for an accurate estimate of the risk proﬁle of a bank is ﬁrst of all
important to the banks itself, but second to central banks regulating the ﬁnancial
system. The Bank for International settlements (BIS) puts great emphasis in its
Basel Accord (and its upcoming sequel, Basel II) on the accurate risk representa-
tions. For example, capital requirements are based on the results of a backtest of
the model of a bank used to predict its value-at-risk. It is the purpose of this thesis
to investigate model risk in general and related issues such as accuracy testing of
risk management models and option pricing models.
1.2 Overview and contribution of thesis
The ﬁrst part of the thesis investigates model risk issues in risk management. In
Chapter 2 we present a framework for backtesting all currently popular risk mea-
surement methods for quantifying market risk (including value-at-risk and expected
shortfall) using the functional delta method. Estimation risk can be taken explic-
itly into account. Based on a simulation study we provide evidence that tests for
expected shortfall with acceptable low levels have a better performance than tests
for value-at-risk in realistic ﬁnancial sample sizes. We propose a way to deter-
mine multiplication factors, and ﬁnd that the resulting regulatory capital scheme
using expected shortfall compares favorably to the current Basel Accord backtesting
scheme.
We test several risk management models for computing expected shortfall for
one-period hedge errors of hedged derivatives positions in Chapter 3. Contrary
to value-at-risk, expected shortfall cannot be tested using a standard binomial test,
since we need information about the distribution in the tail. As derivatives positions
change characteristics and thereby the size of risk exposures over time changes as
well, one cannot apply the standard tests based on stationarity. To overcome this
problem, we present a transformation procedure. For comparison purposes the tests
are also performed for value-at-risk.
Chapter 4 proposes a general framework for quantiﬁcation of model risk. This
framework allows one to allocate regulatory capital to positions in a given market
depending on the extent to which this market can be reliably modelled. Our ap-4 Introduction
proach is based on computing worst-case risk measures over sets of models that are
in some appropriate sense close to a nominal model. The method is general in the
sense that it can be applied with any of the usual risk measures such as value-at-risk
and expected shortfall. In as far as risk measures can also be used as pricing tools
or as determinants of margin requirements, the chapter provides a quantiﬁcation of
model risk in these settings as well. We present an application to stock portfolios
and ﬁnd that for usually applied speciﬁcations misspeciﬁcation risk is much more
important than estimation risk.
In the early days of option pricing plain vanilla options were not traded very
frequently and, therefore, their pricing posed a modelling challenge. Currently, the
market for (short-term) plain vanilla options is so liquid that the pricing of them
does not require much modelling. A simple interpolation of the implied volatility
surface would already give a reasonable price. Therefore, the pricing model risk
is negligible. However, modelling remains crucial for hedging. Depending on the
hedge strategy used the risk proﬁle of a derivative can take (very) diﬀerent forms
(see Green and Figlewski (1999). The issue of hedging model risk for derivatives
p o r t f o l i o si sa d d r e s s e di nChapter 5. We empirically investigate the S&P 500 market
and the $/£,$ /,a n d£/ foreign exchange markets. Furthermore, we advocate
the bootstrap as an alternative to the historical simulation method to determine
estimation and misspeciﬁcation risk. We ﬁnd that in our samples estimation risk
and misspeciﬁcation risk are considerable and often signiﬁcant. Furthermore, we
ﬁnd that in the S&P 500 market a risk premium seems to be demanded for bearing
these risks while this is not the case in the FX markets investigated.
The second part of the thesis deals with pricing interest rate derivatives. In
Chapter 6 we show that discrete string models are observationally equivalent to
market models. We also derive the parsimony of the models. As a consequence of
the observational equivalence discrete string models are a special case of the HJM
framework. The discrete string models can be estimated/calibrated using principal
components analysis in the same manner as the market models.
In Chapter 7 we investigate factor dependence and estimation risk for commonly
traded exotic interest rate derivatives. We employ the popular Libor market model,
and suggest the (stationary) bootstrap method to compute the estimation risk for1.2 Overview and contribution of thesis 5
exotic products. We ﬁnd that autocaps, sticky caps, and ratchet caps are sensitive
to the number of factors used and have considerable estimation risk.
Chapter 8 presents the main conclusions and directions for further research.Part I






Regulators face the important but diﬃcult task of determining appropriate capi-
tal requirements for regulated banks. Such capital requirements should protect the
banks against adverse market conditions and prevent them from taking extraordi-
nary risks (where, in this paper, we focus on market risk). At the same time, regu-
lators should not prevent banks from practicing one of their core businesses, namely
trading risk. The crucial ingredients in the process of risk based capital require-
ment determination are the use of a risk measurement method (to quantify market
risk), a backtesting procedure, and multiplication factors, based on the outcomes
of the backtesting procedure. Regulators apply multiplication factors to the risk
measurement method they use in order to determine the capital requirements. The
multiplication factors depend on the backtesting results, where a bad performance
of the risk measurement method results in a higher multiplication factor. Conse-
quently, to guarantee an appropriate process of capital requirement determination,
regulators need an accurate backtesting procedure, combined with a suitable way of
determining multiplication factors. Based on these requirements the regulators will
assign the risk measurement method.
Since its introduction in the 1996 amendment to the Basel Accord (see Basel
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Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a) and Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision (1996b)) the value-at-risk has become the standard risk measurement
method. However, although the value-at-risk may be interesting from a practical
point of view, it has a serious drawback: it does not necessarily satisfy the property
of subadditivity, which means that one can ﬁnd examples where the value-at-risk of
a portfolio as a whole is higher than that of the sum of the value-at-risks of its mu-
tually exclusive sub-portfolios. An alternative, practically viable risk measurement
method that satisﬁes the subadditivity property (and other desirable properties 1)i s
the expected shortfall. Currently, a debate is going on whether the use of expected
shortfall should be recommended in Basel II. So far, it is not in Basel II due to the
expected diﬃculties concerning backtesting (see Yamai and Yoshiba (2002b)). Thus,
although the value-at-risk does not necessarily satisfy the subadditivity property, it
is still prescribed by regulators, because of its perceived superior performance in
case of backtesting.
Both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall (as well as many other risk
measurement methods) are level-based methods, meaning that one ﬁrst has to choose
a level; given this level, the risk depends on the corresponding left-hand tail of the
proﬁt and loss distribution. For the value-at-risk the Basel Committee chooses a
level of 0.01, meaning that the value-at-risk is based on the 1% quantile of the
proﬁt and loss distribution. For the sake of comparison, one might be tempted to
choose the same level for alternative risk measurement methods, like the expected
shortfall, so that they are calculated based on the same left-hand tail of the proﬁt
and loss distribution. When the level in both cases equals 0.01 it seems obvious
to expect that backtesting expected shortfall will be much harder than backtesting
the value-at-risk, even without trying it out. However, comparing alternative risk
measurement methods by equating their levels does not seem to be appropriate from
the viewpoint of capital reserve determination. From that perspective it seems much
better to choose the levels such that the risk measurement methods result in (more
or less) the same quantiles of the proﬁt and loss distribution. The 0.01-level of
value-at-risk will then correspond to a higher level in case of the expected shortfall.
But then it is no longer clear which method will perform better in backtesting. It
1Namely, translation invariance, monotonicity, and positive homogeneity. These three proper-
ties are also satisﬁed by value-at-risk.2.1 Introduction 11
is the aim of this paper to make this comparison.
The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we provide a general backtesting
procedure for a large class of risk measurement methods, which contains all major
risk measurement methods used nowadays. In particular, as a result a test for
expected shortfall is derived which appears to be new in the literature. Using the
functional delta method we provide a framework that requires the regulator only
to determine the inﬂuence function of the risk measurement method in order to
determine the critical levels of the capital requirements table. We show that the
present backtesting methodology in the Basel Accord is a special case. Furthermore,
a simple method to incorporate estimation risk is presented. The fact that banks
have time-varying portfolio sizes and risk exposures complicates the use of standard
statistical techniques. We deal with this issue using a standardization procedure
based on the probability integral transform also used by Diebold, Gunther and Tay
(1998) and Berkowitz (2001). The key idea of the standardization procedure is that
banks should not only report whether or not the realized proﬁt/loss is beyond the
value-at-risk, but also which quantile of the predicted proﬁt and loss distribution
is realized. Second, we establish, via simulation experiments, that backtests for
expected shortfall have a more promising performance than for value-at-risk, when
the comparison is based on (more or less) equal quantiles instead of equal levels. In
this way we provide evidence for a viable risk based regulatory capital scheme using
expected shortfall with good backtesting properties. Finally, we suggest a general
method to determine multiplication factors for the risk measurement methods using
the backtest procedure developed.
The setup of the paper is as follows. In Section 2.2 we review the most popular
risk measurement methods in current quantitative risk management. In Section 2.3
we present the standardization procedure in order to take account of the time-varying
portfolio sizes and risk exposures. Section 2.4 treats the backtesting of the Basel
Accord, its generalization using the functional delta method, and the incorporation
of estimation risk. Simulation experiments are presented in Section 2.5. In Section
2.6 a suggestion for determination of multiplication factors is given. Finally, Section
2.7 concludes.12 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
2.2 Risk measurement methods
2.2.1 Deﬁnitions and notation
Though risk proﬁles contain much relevant information for risk managers, they be-
come unmanageable for large ﬁrms with many divisions and portfolios. Therefore,
for risk management purposes, risk managers prefer low dimensional characteristics
of the risk proﬁles. In order to compute these low dimensional characteristics they
use a ﬁnancial model m =( Ω ,P), where Ω denotes the states of the world, and P
the postulated probability distribution.2 Ar i s ki sd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s . 3
Deﬁnition 2.1 Let a ﬁnancial model m be given. A risk deﬁned on m is an element
of R(m), the set of random variables deﬁned on Ω.
This deﬁnition, in which a “risk” is a random variable, follows the terminology
of Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999) and Delbaen (2000). Artzner et al.
(1999) deﬁned a risk measure for a particular ﬁnancial model.
Deﬁnition 2.2 Let a ﬁnancial model m be given. A risk measure, ρ, deﬁned on m
is a map from R(m)t oIR ∪{ ∞ } .4
In order to allow for several ﬁnancial models, we use a class of ﬁnancial models
denoted by M. Each of these models deﬁnes a set of risks R(m). Following Kerkhof,
Melenberg and Schumacher (2002) we denote a mapping deﬁned on M that assigns a
risk measure deﬁned on m for each m ∈Mby a risk measurement method deﬁned on
M, RMM. The most well-known risk measurement method nowadays is the value-
at-risk method which was supported by the Basel Committee in the 1996 amendment
to the Basel Accord (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a)).
Before coming to the formal deﬁnitions of the popular risk measurement methods
we present the quantile deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 2.3 (Quantiles) Let X ∈R (m) be a risk for model m =( Ω ,P).
2Formally, a model is deﬁned by m =( Ω ,F,P), where F is the information available.
3Formally, R(m) is deﬁned as the space of all equivalence classes of real-valued measurable
functions on (Ω,F).
4Including ∞ allows risks to be deﬁned on more general probability spaces, see Delbaen (2000).2.2 Risk measurement methods 13
1. Qp (X)=i n f{x ∈ IR : P(X ≤ x) ≥ p} is the lower p -quantile of X.
2. Qp (X)=i n f{x ∈ IR : P(X ≤ x) >p } is the upper p -quantile of X.
The deﬁnition of the value-at-risk method can then be given by
Deﬁnition 2.4 The value-at-risk method with reference asset N and level p ∈




m : R(m)   X  →− Q
p (X/Nm)=Q1−p (−X/Nm) ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } , (2.1)
where Nm denotes the reference asset in model m.
We use a reference asset N (for example, the money market account) to measure the
losses in terms of money lost relative to the reference asset. This allows comparison
of risk measures for diﬀerent time horizons.
Since the introduction of value-at-risk by RiskMetrics (1996), the literature on
value-at-risk has surged (see, for example, Risk Magazine (1996), Duﬃe and Pan
(1997), and Jorion (2000) for overviews). Though value-at-risk is an intuitive risk
measure, the reasoning behind it was more practical than theoretically grounded.
Recently, Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1997) introduced the notion of co-
herent risk measures having the properties of translation invariance, monotonicity,
positive homogeneity, and subadditivity. Their ideas were formalized in Artzner
et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000), amongst others. The value-at-risk method does
not necessarily satisfy the relevant subadditivity property. This means that we can
ﬁnd examples where the value-at-risk of a portfolio is higher than that of the sum
of the value-at-risks of a set of mutually exclusive sub-portfolios (see, for example,
Artzner et al. (1999), Acerbi and Tasche (2002), and Tasche (2002)). A practically
usable coherent risk measure is the expected shortfall as given in Acerbi and Tasche
(2002).
Deﬁnition 2.5 The expected shortfall method with reference asset N and level14 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model m =( Ω ,P) the risk measure ESm given by





+Qp (X/Nm)(p − P(X/Nm ≤ Qp (X/Nm)))) ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } . (2.2)








=I E[ X | X ≤ Qp (X/Nm)]. (2.3)
Thus, informally, value-at-risk gives “the minimum potential loss for the worst 100p
%c a s e s ” 6 while expected shortfall gives the “expected potential loss for the worst
100p % cases”. Therefore, the expected shortfall takes the magnitude of the ex-
ceedance of the value-at-risk into account, while for value-at-risk the magnitude of
exceedance is irrelevant.
2.2.2 Which levels?
Both the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall risk measurement method are
deﬁned for arbitrary levels p ∈ (0,1). This leaves the issue of the choice of p open.
Since we are interested in protecting against adverse market conditions it is clear
that p should be chosen small. But how small? For value-at-risk the most common
choices are p =0 .05 or p =0 .01 (the level chosen by the Basel Committee). In
combination with the current multiplication factors used by the Basel Committee,
the 1% value-at-risk results in more or less satisfactory capital reserves. In order
to get a risk based capital reserve scheme based on expected shortfall, we need to
determine a level p for the expected shortfall. In most comparisons between value-
at-risk and expected shortfall their levels are taken to be equal. This seems to lead to
the general opinion that, although expected shortfall has nice theoretical properties,
it is much harder to backtest than value-at-risk (see Yamai and Yoshiba (2002b)), the
5The additional term Qp (X/Nm)(p − P(X/Nm ≤ Qp (X/Nm))) is needed in order to make the
expected shortfall coherent, see Acerbi and Tasche (2002).
6Most value-at-risk devotees prefer the alternative formulation of “the maximum loss in the
100(1-p)% best cases.”2.3 Standardization procedure 15
main reason why expected shortfall is still absent in Basel II.7 However, for capital
reserve determination it seems to make sense to look at comparable quantiles instead
of levels. For example, take the median shortfall, that is, take the median in the tail
instead of the expectation. The median shortfall with level 2p corresponds to value-
at-risk with level p. If we would compare the backtest results of the median shortfall
and the value-at-risk with the same level, we probably ﬁnd that value-at-risk has a
better performance than median shortfall. But for a valid comparison, we should
use the median shortfall with twice the level of value-at-risk, in which case we ﬁnd
equal performance. A similar reasoning applies to expected shortfall. In order to
have a valid comparison of the backtest results we should look at the quantiles and
not the levels. Doing this for the Gaussian distribution (as a reference distribution),
we ﬁnd p =0 .025 for the expected shortfall when p =0 .01 for value-at-risk.8 In
case of excess kurtosis we need to take a higher level for the expected shortfall for it
to equal the 1% value-at-risk. Since, in practice, we usually encounter distributions
with heavier tails than the Gaussian distribution, the level of 2.5% can be seen as a
lower bound on the level for equal capital requirement.
2.3 Standardization procedure
Let (ht)t∈TT with TT = {1,...,T} (the test period) be a time-series of (in our case
daily) returns on a proﬁt and loss account (P&L) of a bank. Usually, the sequence
(ht)t∈TT cannot be modelled appropriately as a sample from one single distribution,
say F, due to the fact that banks change the composition of their portfolio frequently.
In general, the risk proﬁle (the distribution of the P&L) of the bank changes over
time. Therefore, we allow (ht)t∈TT to be drawn from a diﬀerent (marginal) distribu-
tion each period, that is,
ht ∼ Ft t ∈T T. (2.4)
A bank is required to report the riskiness of its portfolio every day by means of
7We thank Jon Danielsson for pointing this out to us.
8Notice that for the value-at-risk at level p =0 .01 we have −Φ−1(0.01) = 2.33, while for
the expected shortfall at level p =0 .025 we have Φ−1(0.025) = −1.96 and −IE[X|X<−1.96] =
φ(−1.96)/Φ(−1.96) = 2.34 (see (2.3)), when X follows a standard normal distribution (where φ and
Φ denote the density and distribution function of the standard normal distribution, respectively).16 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
ar i s km e a s u r eρ(ht), where ρ(ht) denotes the risk measure for period t using the
information up to time t−1.9 In order to compute these risk measures the bank uses
a sequence of forecast distributions (Pt)t∈TT, with corresponding densities (pt)t∈TT.
Often Ft is assumed to belong to a location-scale family; that is, it is assumed
that the sequence {(ht − µt)/σt}t∈TT is identically distributed (see, for example,
McNeil and Frey (2000) and Christoﬀersen, Hahn and Inoue (2001)). However,
this restricts the way in which the procedure takes portfolio changes of banks into
account. In this set-up moments higher than two are only allowed to vary over time
through the ﬁrst two moments. More generally, we can use the probability integral
transform (see, for example, Van der Vaart (1998)) to go from a non-identically
distributed sequence (ht)t∈TT to an identically distributed sequence (yt)t∈TT.T h i s
transform is deﬁned as
yt = G
−1





−1 (Pt (ht)),t ∈T T, (2.5)
In case Pt = Ft for each t ∈T T, the distribution of yt equals G,o t h e r w i s e ,t h e
distribution of yt is equal to, say, Qt, unequal to G (for at least one time period
t). The following lemma (see special cases in Diebold et al. (1998) and Berkowitz
(2001)) gives the density qt of yt.
Lemma 2.1 Let ft (·) denote the density of ht, pt (·) the density corresponding






















Proof. Just apply the change of variables transformation to yt = G−1 (Pt (ht))
and the result follows.
In case the forecast distributions of the bank are correct, i.e., Pt = Ft, t ∈T T,w e
have that qt (yt)=g (yt). Thus, under the hypothesis that Pt = Ft, t ∈T T we can
9It would be more appropriate to write ρt−1 (ht), but we suppress the subscripts for notational
convenience.2.4 Backtest procedure 17
go from a non-identically distributed sequence (ht)t∈TT to an identically distributed
sequence (yt)t∈TT with distribution G.W ed e n o t et h i sp r o c e d u r ea sstandardization
to G. For example, Berkowitz (2001), uses G = Φ, the standard normal distribution,
in order to use the Gaussian likelihood for his Likelihood Ratio tests.10
2.4 Backtest procedure
After assigning a risk measurement method the regulator faces the important task
of determining the quality of the models that the regulated banks use in order to
compute the risk measure. One of the reasons that the value-at-risk approach is
often preferred to the coherent risk measures is the fact that the quality of value-at-
risk models seems more easily veriﬁable. Therefore, the choice of risk measurement
method by the regulator is based on the tools available to the regulator to ver-
ify model quality. In order to motivate the regulated institutions to improve their
models, regulators often impose model reserves or multiplication factors (see, for
example, the multiplication factors by the Basel Committee). In Section 2.4.1 we
review the backtest procedure of the Basel Committee. Then we provide an alter-
native and more general procedure, in Section 2.4.2 ignoring estimation risk, and in
Section 2.4.3 taking estimation risk into account.
2.4.1 Backtest procedure of Basel Committee
In this section we brieﬂy describe the backtest procedure used by the BIS for deter-
mining the multiplication factors for capital requirements. A full exposition can be
found in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b).
Banks need to produce T (T = 250 in the current BIS implementation) value-
at-risk forecasts (1% value-at-risk in the current BIS implementation) (VaRt)t∈TT,
where VaRt denotes the value-at-risk forecast for day t using the information up to
time t−1. It is assumed that these value-at-risk forecasts (VaRt)t∈TT are such that
the exceedances sequence (et)t∈TT consists of independent elements with a Bernoulli
distribution with probability p, that is, Bern(p), where p denotes the quantile rel-
10Notice, however, that when Pt  = Ft, for at least one t ∈T T, the standardization procedure
will result in distributions Qt, not necessarily equal for diﬀerent t ∈T T.18 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
Table 2.1: BIS multiplication factors
The table shows the plus factors (multiplication factor = 3 + plus factor) used by
the BIS for capital requirements based on a sample of 250. Tables for other sample
sizes can be constructed by letting the yellow zone start when the cumulative















yellow zone 7 0,65 99,60
8 0,75 99,89
9 0,85 99,97
red zone ≥ 10 1,00 99,99
evant to the value-at-risk method employed. The exceedances (et)t∈TT are deﬁned
by
et =I I(−∞,−VaRt) (ht),t ∈T T. (2.7)
By deﬁnition we have that
P(et =1 )=P(ht < −VaRt),t ∈T T. (2.8)
If −VaRt = F
−1
t (p), with F the cumulative distribution function of ht,w eh a v et h a t
P(et =1 )=p and, consequently, the distribution of et indeed follows a Bernoulli-
distribution. Using the cumulative distribution of the binomial distribution one
may then compute multiplication factors based on the number of exceedances. For
completeness, we present Table 2 from Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(1996b) in Table 2.1.
The capital requirement can then be computed as the product of the value-at-
risk at time t,V a R
0.01
t , multiplied by a multiplication factor, mft, that is determined2.4 Backtest procedure 19
by the results of a backtest of model m on the previous T (T = 250 in Basel Accord)
days,11
CRt =m f t · VaR
0.01
t . (2.9)
The backtest procedure given by the Basel Committee described above has some
serious shortcomings. It assumes that under the null hypothesis the exceedances
(et)
T
t=1 are i.i.d. while empirical evidence shows a clustering phenomenon in the
exceedances (see, for example, Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002)). However, in case
of dependence, one could adapt the test procedure by applying, for instance, the
Newey-West (1987) approach which allows for quite general forms of dependence
over time. Another drawback is that the above procedure does not take estimation
risk into account which manifests itself in the fact that VaRt =   F
−1
t (p) which is not
necessarily equal to F
−1
t (p). Due to the limited amount of data there is likely some
inaccuracy in the estimate for the value-at-risk which in eﬀect causes an estimation
error in the exceedances (compare West (1996)). This issue is treated in Section
2.4.3. A ﬁnal drawback is that by transforming the information of the distribution
into one characteristic (exceeding of value-at-risk or not) we lose relevant information
of the return distribution (see also Berkowitz (2001)). In Section 2.5 we see that the
power of the test is aﬀected by removing this information.
2.4.2 General backtest procedure
We assume given a sample of transformed data (yt)t∈TT to which the standardiza-
tion procedure, described in Section 2.3 has been applied; this yields observations
drawn from actual distributions Qt, some or all possibly unequal to the postulated
standardized distribution G. In this subsection we abstract from possible estima-
tion risk in estimating the distribution function. This will be discussed in the next
subsection.
The null hypothesis H0 : Qt = G can be tested against numerous alternatives.
We shall formulate these alternatives under the additional assumption of station-







t−i } instead of VaR
0.01
t (see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b)). Furthermore, the multiplication factors are set every
3 months.20 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
arity, i.e., Qt = Q.12 For example, Berkowitz (2001) tests this hypothesis using a
likelihood ratio (LR) test using the Gaussian likelihood (H1 : Q  = G =Φ )a n da
censored Gaussian likelihood (H1 : Q(−∞,Q−1(p)]  = G(−∞,G−1(p)] ).13 Using the cen-
sored Gaussian likelihood has the advantage that it ignores model failures in the
interior of the distribution: only the tail behavior matters.
Following this line of reasoning, we use risk measurement methods which focus by
construction on the tail behavior to evaluate the null hypothesis. Our main concern
is not conservatism, that is, the true risk  (Q)i ss m a l l e rt h a no re q u a lt o (G), the
risk expected by our model. Since we do not want that the model underestimates
the risk, the alternative is taken to be H1 :  (Q) > (G).
In Section 2.2, we deﬁned risk measurement methods as functions of random
variables (deﬁned on a ﬁnancial model m =( Ω ,P)) following the quantitative risk
measurement literature. For the purpose of testing it is more convenient to deﬁne
the risk measurement method as a functional,   : DF → IR, of a distribution function
to IR ∪∞ .14 Thus, RMMm (X)= (F) for risk X if F is the distribution function
of X associated with model m.
If   : DF → IR is Hadamard diﬀerentiable on DF, we can apply the functional
delta method (see, for example, Van der Vaart (1998) Thm. 20.8)
√







ψt (Q)+op (1), IEψt (Q)=0 , IEψ
2
t (Q) < ∞,
(2.10)
where QT denotes the empirical distribution of the random sample (yt)t∈TT and
ψt (Q) denotes the inﬂuence function of the risk measurement method   at observa-
tion t. As can easily be shown, the common risk measures such as value-at-risk and
expected shortfall are Hadamard diﬀerentiable.15 We can then use the following test
12When presenting the test statistics, we maintain this assumption and implicitly assume that
this stationarity is transferred in the risk measures  (Qt). Notice, however, the testing procedure
is more generally applicable than just for the case of stationarity.
13For distribution function F, F(−∞,F −1(p)] denotes the left tail of the distribution up to the pth
quantile.
14DF denotes the space of all distribution functions, that is, all non-decreasing cadlag functions
F on [−∞,∞] with F(−∞) ≡ limx→−∞ F(x)=0a n dF(∞) ≡ limx→∞ F(x)=1 .DF is equipped
with the metric induced by the supremum norm.
15For the value-at-risk, see, for example, Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Lemma 3.9.20. In











with V =I E ψ2
t (Q)a n d (Q) evaluated under the null hypothesis, Q = G.16 Some
important examples are:




the inﬂuence function ψ (Q)i sg i v e nb y
ψVaR (Q)=−



































+V a R( Q), (2.16)
where zp denotes the pth quantile of the standard Gaussian distribution.
Example 2.2 (Exceedances) In the case of the number of exceedances written as
for Hadamard diﬀerentiable functions to the quantile function and the mean, see, for example, Van
der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Lemma 3.9.3.
16Under the assumption of stationarity, i.e., Qt = Q, we could also evaluate V under the alter-










. However, our simulation study indicates a
much worse performance of the test statistics using this estimate than when evaluating V under
the null.22 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
a function of the distribution function
 (Q)=I I(−∞,Q−1(p)], (2.17)
the inﬂuence function ψ (Q)i sg i v e nb y




exc (Q)=p(1 − p). (2.19)














z0.9999Tp(1 − p)+pT (2.21)
For the regular backtest size of 250, these critical values are equal to the exact
setting of the binomial distribution used by the BIS.


















































































2 +E S( Q) (2.26)
We conclude this subsection by illustrating that the test statistics can easily be
implemented for the Gaussian case G = Φ, by presenting the outcomes of IEψ2
t (G)
in case of value-at-risk and expected shortfall. For this, let φ(x) denote the density
function of the standard Gaussian N (0,1) distribution and zp the pth quantile of
the standard normal distribution. The value-at-risk in case of a normal distribution
N(0,1) is given by
VaRp (X)=zp, (2.27)
and the expected shortfall is given by
ESp (X)=−φ(zp)/p. (2.28)
IEψ2





































The backtesting procedures described in this section assume that the forecasted
distributions (Pt)t∈TT of the proﬁt/loss are given. It seems natural to penalize banks
with a plus factor for using inappropriate model families, but not for just having to
estimate a correctly speciﬁed model (assuming that they use their data eﬃciently).
In order to do so, we derive in this section backtest procedures that take estimation
risk into account.
Again, we use the standardization procedure described in Section 2.3. We assume
given a random estimation sample (yt)t∈Te , Te = {−N +1 ,...,0}, and a random
testing sample (yt)t∈TT TT = {1,...,T} with yt ∼ Q (Q = G under the null). We
then have
√







where ψ (·) is the inﬂuence function of  (·). This yields (still under the null)
√
T ( (QT) −  (QN)) =
√





N ( (QN) −  (Q))
d →N
 





N → c as N →∞and T →∞ .
If the estimation period would grow with time, c would tend to zero. In practice,
one usually speciﬁes a ﬁnite ﬁxed estimation period (for example, 2 years) and
computes the risk measure based on this estimation period. This is a so-called
rolling window estimation procedure, which can be approximated in our setting by
taking c = T
N in (2.29).
For the examples in 2.4.2 we can derive the critical values for the yellow and
red zones in the same way by replacing V by (1 + c)V . With the incorporation of2.5 Simulation results 25
Table 2.2: Simulation results for size of tests
This table presents the Type I errors (in percentages) if Ft = Pt = N (0,1)
for t ∈ TT for T = 125, 250, 500, and 1000. The argument H0 indicates
that the variance used is IEψ2











.T a i l 0.025 signiﬁes Berkowitz tail test. The
number of simulations equals 10,000.
T Exceedances VaR0.01 (H0)V a R 0.01 (H1)E S 0.025 (H0)E S 0.025 (H1)T a i l 0.025
125 3.75 2.75 1.81 2.64 3.24 3.05
250 4.17 4.81 2.87 5.14 4.64 5.42
500 6.63 2.91 2.27 9.38 8.10 5.16
1000 4.51 3.87 2.98 4.34 2.63 5.33
estimation risk in the backtesting procedure we introduce an additional degree of
freedom for the regulator, namely the choice of c (or N,s i n c eT could already be
chosen by the regulator).
2.5 Simulation results
In this section we compare the ﬁnite sample behaviors of the backtest procedures.
First, we determine the actual size of the tests for the exceedances ratio, value-at-
risk, and expected shortfall. For simplicity, we take Ft = N (0,1), the standard
normal distribution, for t ∈T T. To check the performance of the tests for size,
we take Pt = Ft, t ∈T T, and set the signiﬁcance level α =0 .05. We verify the
performance of the tests given in the examples in Section 2.4.2 using G =Φ ,t h e
standard normal distribution function.17 The tests are compared to the censored
LR test of Berkowitz (2001), which we refer to as the Berkowitz tail test. Table 2.2
shows the results of the performance of the size of the tests. We see that the size for
the three tests (Exceedances, value-at-risk, and expected shortfall) seem reasonable
for the common sample size of 250. The Berkowitz tail test seems to converge a bit
faster.
17Using G = U [0,1] results in very poor results for smaller sample sizes. The reason is that
by transforming the data to uniform random numbers the symmetry in the test is lost due to the
non-linear shape of F.26 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
Next, we investigate the power of the diﬀerent tests. In practice, ﬁnancial time
series often exhibit excess kurtosis with respect to the normal distribution and have
longer left tails. We consider three alternatives that replicate (parts of) this be-
havior. First, we use the student t−distribution with 5 degrees of freedom, that
is, Ft = t5. This distribution has heavier tails than the normal distribution, but
is still symmetric. Second, we use two alternatives from the Normal Inverse Gaus-
sian (NIG) family.18 The NIG distribution allows one to control both the level
of excess kurtosis and the skewness. We consider two cases: a symmetric case
with a moderately high kurtosis, β =0 ,α=
 
β2 +1 ,δ=1 /(1 + β2),µ=0
and a case where the distribution is very skewed to the left and has a large kur-
tosis, β = −0.25,α=
 
β2 +1 ,δ=1 /(1 + β2),µ=0 . T h i r d ,w et a k ea
GARCH(1,1)-process,19 with parameter values ω =0 .05, γ1 =0 .25, and γ2 =0 .7t o
allow for a time-dependent distribution under the alternative hypothesis. For the
time-independent cases we present the results for VaR and ES with the test statistic
estimated under the null as well as under the alternative (see footnote 16). Table 2.3
contains the results. We see that in case of a time-independent alternative for both
the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall, the tests with variance evaluated under
the null hypothesis have (far) more power. The diﬀerence with the test using the es-
timated variance under the alternative narrows when the sample size increases. The
test for expected shortfall performs best in detecting the misspeciﬁcation, also when
the alternative is GARCH(1,1) for T ≥ 250; the number-of-exceedances test has less
power than the value-at-risk test and the expected shortfall test. The Berkowitz tail
test also performs well and, therefore, seems a worthwhile auxiliary test, but, in





















exp{β (x − µ)},
with q (x)=
√
1+x2 and K1 (x) the modiﬁed Bessel function of the third kind. See, for example,
Barndorﬀ-Nielsen (1996).





ht = ω + γ1r2



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































328 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
general, trails the test for expected shortfall. Especially for the shorter sample sizes
the test for expected shortfall performs better with only GARCH(1,1) for T = 125
as an exception.
Finally, we take estimation risk into account. In Table 2.4 the results are shown
for an equal estimation and testing period. It gives the expected result that the
longer the samples the better the power of the tests. However, the performance of
the test for value-at-risk with the variance evaluated under the alternative (in the
time-independent cases) is quite bad. In Table 2.5 we ﬁxed the testing period at 1
year (250 days) and varied the estimation period. As expected the results improve
for longer estimation periods. Again, the performance of the test for value-at-risk
with the variance evaluated under the (time-independent) alternative is quite bad.
Concluding, we ﬁnd that the performances of the tests with the variance eval-
uated under (a time-independent) H0 have far more power than the tests with the
variance evaluated under H1 for sample sizes realistic for ﬁnancial data. Further-
more, we ﬁnd that the performance for the size of the tests of the 2.5% expected
shortfall is about equal to the 1% value-at-risk. However, the power of the 2.5%
expected shortfall test is much better than that of the 1% value-at-risk.
2.6 Multiplication factors
In this section we propose a method to compute multiplication factors for capital
requirements determination. Our starting point is the test statistic (2.11). If the
test statistic results in rejection of the null hypothesis, then we might conclude that
 (G) is taken too low. The question then is by which multiplication factor  (G)
at least should be increased, such that the test statistic does no longer result in
rejection of the null. Let  ∗ (QT) the realized value of  (Q). Then the minimum
multiplication factor, mf, for which the null hypothesis would not be rejected follows
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32.6 Multiplication factors 31
where s∗
T denotes the realized value of the test statistic. More generally, we may want
to use a basis multiplication factor (bmf) and we may want to cap the multiplication





































We show the results for our proposed multiplication factor applied to value-at-
risk, and expected shortfall in Figure 2.1, where we use G =Φ ,α =0 .05, bmf = 3,
and limit = 4. As the variance in (2.29) is larger than without estimation risk, the
basis multiplication factor should be taken higher if one takes estimation risk into
account. This is probably also one of the reasons why the multiplication factor of
the BIS is rather high. For reasons of comparison with the BIS scheme, we use here
a bmf of 3 and a limit of 4. See Kerkhof et al. (2002) for suggestions on setting the
bmf for markets depending on the reliability with which the market can be modeled.
On the horizontal axis we plot the quantiles of the distribution of the test statistic in
(2.11) under the null hypothesis and on the vertical axis the resulting multiplication
factors. As a benchmark we also plot the multiplication factors when using the
current Basel procedure (now as a function of the quantiles of the corresponding test
under the null). We see that the multiplication factors according to our proposal
seem to compare favorably with those according to the Basel procedure. Moreover,
the multiplication factors for expected shortfall are slightly lower than for value-
at-risk. This has to do with the result that expected shortfall is more accurately
estimated under the null than value-at-risk, i.e., the variance V in case of expected
shortfall is smaller than in case of value-at-risk.
In Figure 2.2 we report the results of applying the multiplication factors from
(2.31) to value-at-risk and expected shortfall, using again the outcomes of the Basel
procedure as a benchmark. We consider two cases: ﬁrst, we look at the case where
the model is correct, Pt = Ft = N (µ,σ2); second, the case of a seriously misspeciﬁed
model, Pt = N (µ,σ2)a n dFt = NIG(α,−0.25,δ,µ)w i t hα,δ,µ as before, being the32 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
Figure 2.1: Multiplication factors
This ﬁgure shows the multiplication factors on the vertical axis against the quantiles
of the test statistic on the horizontal axis. We used G =Φ ,α =0 .05, and a basic
multiplication factor bmf= 3.
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Figure 2.2: Multiplication factors (size, power)
This ﬁgure shows the simulated cdf of the multiplication factors. In the upper panel
the case of Ft = N (µ,σ2) is shown. In the lower panel we have the case where
Ft = NIG(α,−0.25,δ,µ). In both panels Pt = N (µ,σ2). The number of days
equals 250 and the number of simulations equals 10,000.
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case where the distribution is very skewed to the left and has a large kurtosis.
The results of the correctly speciﬁed case reﬂect the outcomes presented in the
previous ﬁgure: expected shortfall, having the lowest multiplication factors, per-
forms best. Notice that the multiplication factor scheme from the current Basel
Accord results in (too) large multiplication factors. In the second case of a misspec-
iﬁed model we see that the test using expected shortfall results in higher factors in
more cases (due to the higher power) than the test using value-at-risk. For both
expected shortfall and value-at-risk the penalty depends smoothly on the outcome
of the test. The multiplication factors according to the current Basel Accord more
or less correspond to those of value-at-risk and expected shortfall, but in a heavily
non-smooth way.
Concluding, in the case that the bank uses a correctly speciﬁed model, we ﬁnd
that the capital requirement scheme using expected shortfall leads to the least severe
penalties. On the basis of the current Basel Accord banks would be punished more
often and then also severely. Furthermore, in case of a misspeciﬁed model, we ﬁnd
that the capital requirement scheme using expected shortfall rejects the misspeciﬁed
models most often, the multiplication factor depends smoothly on the size of the
misspeciﬁcation found and the variance in the multiplication factors is low.
2.7 Conclusions
In this paper we suggested a backtest framework for a large and relevant group of
risk measurement methods using the functional delta method. We showed that,
for a large group of risk measurement methods containing all currently used risk
measurement methods, the backtest procedure can readily be found after computing
the appropriate inﬂuence function of the risk measurement method. The inﬂuence
functions for value-at-risk and expected shortfall are provided. Since this general
framework is based on asymptotic results, we investigated whether the procedure is
appropriate for realistic ﬁnite sample sizes. The results indicate that this is indeed
the case, and that, contrary to common belief, expected shortfall is not harder to
backtest than value-at-risk if we adjust the level of expected shortfall. Furthermore,
the power of the test for expected shortfall is considerably higher than that of value-34 Backtesting for Risk-Based Regulatory Capital
at-risk. Since the probability of detecting a misspeciﬁed model is higher for a given
value of the test statistic, this allows the regulator to set lower multiplication factors.
We suggested a scheme for determining multiplication factors. This scheme results
in less severe penalties for the backtest based on expected shortfall compared to
backtests based on value-at-risk and to the current Basel Accord backtesting scheme
in case the test incorrectly rejects the model. In case of a misspeciﬁed model the
multiplication factors are on average about the same for all tests. However, the
multiplication factors based on the expected shortfall test are smooth and have low
variance.
Thus, the prospects for setting up viable capital determination schemes based
on expected shortfall seem promising.Chapter 3
Testing Expected Shortfall Models
for Derivatives Positions
3.1 Introduction
Managing the risks of derivative assets has always been one of the major challenges
in risk management. With the strong increase in derivative positions in the portfolios
of ﬁnancial institutions the task of managing these risks has become more daunting
than ever. An equally daunting task is testing the quality of models used to quantify
the risk of derivatives positions.
Since the Basel Committee advised the use of value-at-risk (VaR) in the 1996
amendment to the Basel Accord for determination of regulatory capital, many stud-
ies have investigated VaR (see, for example, the overviews in Jorion (2000) and
Dowd (1998) and the references therein). Recently, a literature emerged advocating
alternative risk measures, namely, coherent risk measures and, in particular, ex-
pected shortfall (see, for example, Artzner et al. (1999), Delbaen (2000), Acerbi and
Tasche (2002), and Tasche (2002)). The advantages of expected shortfall over VaR
are that it satisﬁes the property of subadditivity and the fact that portfolio opti-
mization under expected shortfall constraints yields reasonable portfolios, contrary
to VaR (see, for example, Yamai and Yoshiba (2002a) for the constrained portfo-
lio optimization). Though most people agree that from a theoretical point of view
expected shortfall is to be preferred to VaR, it is still less widely used due to the
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lack of a solid backtesting procedure. Recently, Kerkhof and Melenberg (2003) (see
also Chapter 2 of this thesis) introduced a test for expected shortfall and found that
for appropriately adjusted levels, expected shortfall has more desirable backtesting
properties than VaR.
Though quite a number of studies have tested the performance of several VaR
models, derivatives positions were rarely explicitly taken into account (see, for exam-
ple, McNeil and Frey (2000), Christoﬀersen et al. (2001), and Berkowitz and O’Brien
(2002)). In cases where derivative positions were explicitly taken into account, the
literature usually focused on the computation of VaR rather than on the testing of
the VaR models, since the standard binomial test can be applied (see, for example,
Kupiec (1995) and El-Jahel, Perraudin and Sellin (1999)). However, the standard
binomial test cannot be applied to expected shortfall. In order to test expected
shortfall we need information of the distribution of bank’s proﬁt and losses (P&L)
account, or more speciﬁcally its tail behavior.
One of the problems that one faces in determining the P&L distribution of (non-
linear) derivatives is that their risk characteristics change over time. For example,
an option can change from a 1 year at-the-money option into a 3 month far out-
of-the-money option, resulting in completely diﬀerent risk characteristics. In this
chapter, we propose a method to take into account the diﬀerences in risk exposures
between options with diﬀerent characteristics.
We consider several methods to estimate the risk measure for the one-day hedge
error. The ﬁrst method we consider is a simple Black-Scholes based model which
assumes normal asset returns and constant implied volatilities. Method 2 relaxes the
assumption of normal asset return and uses a nonparametric asset return distribution
based on historical simulation. Method 3 is a full historical simulation method that
assumes a nonparametric asset returns distribution and a nonparametric implied
volatility distribution. The fourth method is a Vector AutoRegessive (VAR) model
for asset returns and implied volatilities returns with Gaussian errors, while method
5 considers nonparametric errors instead.
We test the models on the FX market and, in particular, the mutual exchange
rates of the US, the UK, and Japan. Furthermore, we test the models on S&P
500 options. We ﬁnd that the historical simulation method and the VAR models3.2 Quantifying daily market risk 37
perform reasonably well.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes daily
market risk for derivative positions. Section 3.3 discusses the aging, moneyness, and
level eﬀects of derivative positions and a possible transformation to standardize the
risk exposures. The models used are described in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 describes
the test used and Section 3.6 presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 3.7
concludes.
3.2 Quantifying daily market risk
Consider the situation where a ﬁnancial institution manages a portfolio which is
short in options. Due to this position the ﬁnancial institution is subject to a risk
exposure with respect to the value of the options. To decrease this risk exposure
the ﬁnancial institution hedges the derivative using a particular hedge strategy.
To illustrate, consider a derivative whose price at day t equals ft. The ﬁnancial
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ft − γt · St
Nt
. (3.1)
Then we will have as accounting identity
ft = γt · St + αtNt. (3.2)
The next day the price of the derivative will be ft+1, while the hedging position (if
there are no intermediate adaptations) will be valued γt ·St+1 +αtNt+1. The diﬀer-
ence between the next period’s derivative’s price and the hedge position induces the
daily market risk. A ﬁnancial institution can quantify this daily market risk by as-
suming some method to estimate or calibrate the next day’s probability distribution
of (ft+1,S t+1,N t+1). Taking a numeraire whose future value at t + 1 is known (for
example, a one-period discount bond) reduces the problem to estimating or calibrat-38 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
ing the next day’s probability distribution of (ft+1,S t+1), but now with respect to
the numeraire instead of cash. This allows for estimation or calibration of the daily
market risk measures (for instance, value-at-risk or expected shortfall). Our interest
in this chapter is in risk measures of the daily market risk proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, we
are interested in the distribution of
E
1
t ≡ ∆ft − γt∆St, (3.3)
where ∆xt ≡ xt+1 − xt for x = f,S. E1
t denotes the one-period hedge error and
its distribution which is termed the daily market risk proﬁle is denoted by L(E1
t).
Examples of the daily market risk proﬁle are given in the upper panel of Figure 3.1,
which presents daily market risk proﬁles of a delta hedged 3 month at-the-money, 1
year at-the-money, and 3 year at-the-money (ATM) call option in a Black-Scholes
world with annual instantaneous drift µ =0 .1, instantaneous volatility σ =0 .2, and
instantaneous riskless interest rate equal to r =0 .05. Time t is measured in days (1
year equals 250 days). In line with Boyle and Emanuel (1980) a shifted non-central
χ2−distribution is found as an approximation for the market risk proﬁle.
3.3 Aging, moneyness, and level eﬀect
Figure 3.1 clearly shows that the distribution of hedge errors of options depends on
the time to maturity, τ = T − t. We refer to the fact that the daily market risk
proﬁle changes with the time to maturity as the aging eﬀect. For shorter maturities,
the daily risk proﬁle is more spread out. The middle panel of Figure 3.1 shows the
dependence of the daily risk proﬁle on moneyness which is termed the moneyness
eﬀect.1 Out-of-the-money options have more variability than in-the-money options.
Finally, in the lower panel we see the inﬂuence of the level on the risk proﬁles, the
so-called level eﬀect. It is easy to show that this eﬀect is linearly dependent on the
level.
The three eﬀects shown in Figure 3.1 indicate the problems one encounters when
using time series data of a particular option to extract information of the daily
1Moneyness is deﬁned as m = log(ertSt/k). A call option is called in-the-money (ITM) if
m>0, at-the-money if (ATM) m = 0, and out-of-the-money (OTM) if m<0.3.3 Aging, moneyness, and level eﬀect 39
Figure 3.1: Aging, moneyness, and level eﬀects
On the horizontal axis the return on the hedged portfolio is given in percentages.
Total number of simulations = 100,000. The upper panel shows the daily risk proﬁles
of delta hedged ATM call option with a maturities of 3 months, 1 year, and 3 years
and level 100. The middle panel shows the daily risk proﬁles of delta hedged OTM
(m = −0.1) , ATM (m = 0), and ITM (m =0 .1) call option with a maturity
1 year and level of 100. The lower panel shows the daily risk proﬁles of a delta
hedged ATM call option with a maturity of 1 year and levels of 50, 100, and 200.
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market risk proﬁle of that option. The observations of hedge errors of the option
are taken with diﬀerent times to maturity and potentially diﬀerent moneyness and
levels. Since the distribution diﬀers for these situations, these hedge errors are
hard to compare. In order to suppress the level eﬀect we ﬁrst determine a level-






ft − γt · St
. (3.4)
The dependence on the daily market risk proﬁle on the aging and moneyness
eﬀect is more complicated to resolve. To get rid of the aging and moneyness eﬀect, it
is natural to use data on derivatives with the same moneyness and time to maturity,
if possible. For FX derivatives and interest-rate derivatives these data are available,
since these are quoted in the market with a ﬁxed time to maturity. For equity
derivatives, however, this is more complicated due to the fact that these derivatives
have ﬁxed maturity dates. Therefore, we have to transform our data.
3.3.1 Transformation of the data
A possible way to correct the daily market risk proﬁle for the aging and moneyness
eﬀect is to assume a parametric option pricing model so that one can use the char-
acteristics of such a model to ﬁnd the appropriate corrections. In this section we
correct for the aging and moneyness eﬀect using the Black-Scholes model.2 Denoting
the model price by f(ξt)w i t hξt =( St,t) a Taylor series expansion gives




2 +Θ ( ξt)∆t + O(∆t
3/2), (3.5)
where
∆St = St+∆t − St. (3.6)
∆(ξt) ≡
∂f
∂S(ξt) denotes the ﬁrst-order partial derivative of f with respect to the
underlying, Γ(ξt) ≡
∂2f
∂S2(ξt) denotes the second order partial derivative with respect
to the underlying, and Θ(ξt) ≡
∂f
∂t(ξt) denotes the ﬁrst partial derivative with respect
to the current time.
2Other models with suﬃciently smooth pricing formulas can also be used.3.3 Aging, moneyness, and level eﬀect 41
We take ∆t =1 .L e tE1
t denote the one-period hedge error from time t to t +1
and let {γt}
T
t=1 denote the hedging strategy. Neglecting the remainder term from
now on, we get
E
1
t =∆ ft − γt∆St




2 +Θ ( ξt).
In general, the hedge errors E1
1,...,E1
T resulting from the hedge strategy {γt}
T
t=1
do not have the same distribution. To evaluate the performance of a hedge strategy,
we want to “standardize” the hedge errors such that they have the same distribution.
As reference distribution, we use the distribution, L(E1
t∗), for some t∗ such that
0 ≤ t∗ <T.
We assume strict stationarity of the (conditional) diﬀerenced underlying process,
implying,
L(∆St |F t)=L(∆St∗ |F t∗) (3.7)





















t − γt)∆St −
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In (3.8) we found a relation between the one-period hedge error from t∗ to t∗ +1
with characteristics (St∗,m t∗,τ t∗) and the one-period hedge error from t to t+1with
characteristics (St,m t,τ t). Therefore, we can transform the data set of realizations
drawn from not identically distributed distributions to one of realizations drawn from
approximately identically distributed distributions. To obtain (3.8) we neglected the
remainder term and used a parametric model in (3.5), so that this can only be seen
as a good practical approximation and not as a strict identity.
Suppose we have a time series of hedge errors from a one year ATM call option.42 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
Figure 3.2: Transformation
This ﬁgure shows the eﬀect of the transformation described in 3.3.1. The
graph shows the risk proﬁle when the hedge errors of a delta hedged ATM
option position are corrected for all eﬀects, and the risk proﬁles corrected
for all eﬀects but the aging eﬀect, the moneyness eﬀect, and the level ef-
fect, respectively. The reference distribution is a one year ATM call option.
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In Figure 3.2 we see the result of correcting the time series hedge errors for aging,
moneyness, and level eﬀect. This is in accordance with the ”true” distribution
determined by cross-sectional simulation. Furthermore, the distribution is given in
case one of the corrections is left out. We see that the distribution is more spread
out, if we leave out the aging eﬀect correction. This follows from the fact that
gamma is higher for short term options. Not correcting for the moneyness results
(for an originally ATM option) in a less spread out distribution due to the fact that
the gamma is lower for ITM and OTM options. Finally, we see that the distribution
which is not corrected for level is rather similar to the corrected one. The level eﬀect,
however, becomes more important in case the sample is longer and the underlying
moves further away from its starting position.
3.4 Daily market risk forecasting methods
In this section, we discuss several methods that can be used to compute risk mea-
sures, such as value-at-risk and expected shortfall, of the daily market risk. In doing










t for models i =1 ,...,5. After applying the standardizing



















t+1 − St where ft and St denote observed
prices.
We have returns data available of the underlying (S), the implied volatility















,w i t hhx
t =l o g( xt/xt−1).
From these data we use {h1,...,hT} for testing and we refer to this set as the testing
sample. The testing sample is used in the backtest to determine the quality of the
method. All the models discussed below are used to estimate the distribution of
the relative one-period hedge error ˜ E1,m i, denoted by F mi. For notational conve-
3The time series is also assumed to be ergodic and to satisfy the necessary regularity conditions
needed for Central limit theorems used later on.44 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
nience, we neglect the dependence of ˜ E1,mi,∆ f
mi
t ,a n d∆ S
mi
t on mi in the following
enumeration of models.
1. Method 1 is a naive method which more or less follows the Black-Scholes world







t)a n dt h a tσ, rd,a n drf are constant. To estimate
µt and σ2
t we use the returns data of the underlying, hs
t,...,hs
t−N,t og e tµt
and σ2
t, the so-called rolling window estimators for µt and σ2
t.F o rt =1 ,...,T
we draw hs
t from N (µt,σ2











from which we produce an estimate





2. Method 2 is a historical simulation method for the underlying asset. The
implied volatilities, domestic and foreign interest rates are as in method 1.
Method 2 allows a distribution for the underlying that diﬀers from the nor-
mal distribution. It assumes (hs
t)
T
t=−N+1 is an i.i.d. sample. We estimate the
distribution, L(hs




(with replacement) from (hs
t∗)
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3. Method 3 is a full historical simulation method. This type of method is often
used in practice and assumes that (ht)
T
t=−N+1 is an i.i.d. sample. We estimate
the distribution, L(ht) by the empirical distribution of (ht∗)
t
t∗=t−N+1.D r a w i n g
ht (with replacement) from (ht∗)
t
















4. In method 4 a ﬁrst-order Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model for estimation
of the distribution of (St+1,σ t+1)
T
t=1 is estimated using (ht∗)
t
t∗=t−N+1 for t =
4Note that the sequence (∆St)
T
t=1 is not used to produce a price path (St)
T
t=1 of the underlying.
It only serves to compute a series of hedge errors. The price path of the underlying is given by the
data.
5Considering the stationarity assumption, it would be more eﬃcient to use all available data,























ht+1 =Φ 0 +Φ 1ht + ut+1,t =1 ,...,T (3.10)
with
L(ut+1|Ft)=N (0,Σt),





t=1 to generate (∆St+1,∆σt+1) for t =1 ,...,T and (∆ft)
T
t=1.G i v e n t h e






from which we produce an estimate





5. In method 5 a ﬁrst-order Vector AutoRegressive (VAR) model for estimation
of the distribution of (St+1,σ t+1)
T

































t denotes the empirical distribution function of u at time t esti-
mated from ut−N+1,...,ut−1.T h i sg i v e s( Φ 0,t,Φ1,t)
T
t=1,a n d( Σ t)
T
t=1 to generate
(∆St+1,∆σt+1) for t =1 ,...,T and (∆ft)
T













In this section, we present a test to evaluate daily market risk evaluation models
described in Section 3.4. Time t runs from −N+1toT.T h el a s tT observations are46 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
used for testing. At each point in time the method is estimated from the previous
N observations, that is, we use the so-called rolling window estimator.


















We would like to test whether the predicted risk measures are the same for the
method hedge errors as for the empirical hedge errors. Let  (F mi) represent the
characteristic of interest of F mi and let  (F) represent the corresponding charac-
teristic of interest of F.
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Ψt + op (1), IEΨ t =0 ,IE (Ψ t)
2 < ∞, (3.16)
where Ψ
mi
t and Ψt are called the inﬂuence functions. In Appendix A the inﬂuence
functions for VaR and expected shortfall are given. Then, under the null hypothesis













































t+1 − xt and ∆xt ≡ xt+1 − xt for x = S,f.I n





































So, with ˆ V (using, for example, the estimator of Newey and West (1987)) satisfying
ˆ V
p

















Since we can simulate from F mi as often as we would like, we can strengthen




 k( ˆ F
mi
t ), with K equal to the number of trials,
instead of ˆ  (F
mi
t ). This gives for ﬁxed K
√




















 2 < ∞. (3.20)
The expression in (3.20) converges in probability to zero as K →∞and so we can
take as a test statistic
T
 


























The FX market is by far the most liquid market in the world with a daily turnover
of about 1.5 trillion US dollars (for comparison, the NYSE has a daily turnover of
about 30 billion US dollar). In this section, we apply the test outlined above to call48 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
options on the dollar-yen, dollar-pound, and pound-dollar exchange rates. Quotes
are in implied volatilities in the FX market and prices can be computed using the
Garman-Kohlhagen model (see Garman and Kohlhagen (1983)). This is a version


























rd is the domestic instantaneous riskless interest rate, rf is the foreign instantaneous
riskless interest rate, σ denotes the instantaneous volatility of the exchange rate and
Φ(·) denotes the Gaussian cumulative distribution function.
The daily data available consist of implied volatilities of 3 month ATM call
options on dollar-yen, dollar-pound, and pound-dollar exchange rates, the corre-
sponding exchange rates, and the US, UK, and Japanese interest rates.7 The data
run from August 9, 1995 until December 13, 2002 and are shown in Figure 3.3.
This results in 1918 data points. We use a two year rolling window estimation
period for all the models. Taking the number of trading days per year equal to 250
gives us estimation periods of 500 observations and 1418 observations for testing. In
Kerkhof and Melenberg (2003) (see also Chapter 2 of this thesis) it is argued that
for fair comparison with a 1% value-at-risk the level of expected shortfall should be
about 2.5%.8 The quality of the models is tested by tests whether the variances, the
1%-value-at-risk, and 2.5% expected shortfall of the hedge error as predicted by the
models and empirical hedge errors are equal.9 The level for value-at-risk is chosen
at 1% such that it equals the current level in the 1996 amendment to the Basel
Accord (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b)). Table 3.1 reports
the variance, 1% value-at-risk, and 2.5% expected shortfall for an investment of $100
in a portfolio of ATM call options and the underlying exchange rate with as ratio
7The data have been kindly shared by ABN-AMRO Bank.
8This argument is based on the normal distribution, but seems to be approximately correct in
our sample.
9In the absence of data on ITM and OTM options, we have assumed a ﬂat volatility smile for
the FX options. Since we are looking at one-day hedge errors and the FX volatility smile is rather
ﬂat near the money, this should not lead to severe biases.3.6 Empirical Results 49
Figure 3.3: FX data
In the upper panel the normalized price paths of the USD/JPY,
USD/GBP, and GBP/JPY are given. In the lower panel the
implied volatilities for the 3m ATM call options are given.
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the hedge strategy.
For all exchange rates we ﬁnd that the methods 1 and 2 are rejected for all
risk measures. The full historical simulation method (method 3) performs well for
all exchange rates and all risk measures. The parametric VAR method, method
4, is rejected for the USD/JPY exchange rate for being too conservative, while
it is rejected in the GBP/JPY exchange rate for underestimating the risk. The
nonparametric VAR method, method 5, is conservative in all markets and is rejected
for the USD/JPY and USD/GBP exchange rates.
3.6.2 S&P 500 options
We have available option data on the S&P 500 ranging from January 2, 1992 till
August 29, 1997. Quotes on the options are the end-of-day quotes with synchronous
observations of the underlying index. For the FX options we have data on ﬁxed time
to maturity and moneyness options available. For the S&P 500 we have ﬁxed ma-
turity and varying moneyness option data. Therefore, we apply the transformation
method of Section 3.3.1. We analyze the models for calculating the risk measures50 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
Table 3.1: Tests of Risk measures for the 3 month exchange rates
This table shows the empirical standard deviations, VaR0.01,a n dE S 0.025 and those
obtained from methods 1,...,5 for the USD/JPY, GBP/JPY, and USD/GBP ex-
change rate. We test whether the method predictions correspond to the empirical
quantities. The p-values of these tests are given in parentheses. In order to reduce
sampling error we used K =1 0 ,000.
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Table 3.2: Tests of risk measures for delta hedged 3 month S&P 500 options
This table shows the empirical standard deviations, VaR0.01,a n dE S 0.025 and those
obtained from methods 1,...,5 for a delta-hedged positions in 3 month ATM S&P
500 options. We test whether the method predictions correspond to the empirical
quantities. The p-values of these tests are given in parentheses. In order to reduce
sampling error we used K =1 0 ,000.





































































for 3 month ATM options. For this we use the options with time to maturity closest
to 3 months and closest to the ATM level. Again we investigate a portfolio of $100
invested in options and the underlying asset. As hedge ratio we apply the standard
Black-Scholes delta with continuous dividend yield.
We ﬁnd that the empirical risks for S&P500 options are higher than for the FX
options. We ﬁnd that the positions in the 1 year options are more risky than the
positions in the 3 months options. For the tests of the S&P500 options we get more
or less the same results as for the FX options. Only models 3, 4, and 5 have a
acceptable prediction behavior.
Overall, we see that models 1 and 2 do not perform well and underestimate the
risk of delta hedged derivatives positions in almost all cases. This can be explained
by the fact that they do not take ﬂuctuations in the levels of implied volatilities into
account. The historical simulation method and both VAR models perform about
the same, although the VAR models for changes in the underlying and implied52 Testing Expected Shortfall Models for Derivatives Positions
volatilities are sometimes a bit too conservative. Since the historical simulation
method and the VAR model with historical simulation take more time to compute
than the Gaussian VAR model where VaR and ES can be computed analytically, it
seems easiest to compute both VaR and ES based on the Gaussian VAR model.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter we tested several risk management models for computing expected
shortfall and value-at-risk for one-period hedge errors of hedged derivatives positions.
Though value-at-risk can be tested using a binomial test, this is not the case for
expected shortfall and we need information of the distribution in the tail. By nature,
the characteristics of derivatives positions are changeable and as a consequence the
size of risk exposures varies over time. To overcome this problem, we present a
transformation procedure.
We empirically test the performance of several models, based on tests for stan-
dard deviation, value-at-risk, and expected shortfall. We ﬁnd that in order to get
good indication of the risk of a hedged derivative in both the FX and the equity
market it is of crucial importance to take the variation in the implied volatilities
into account. We ﬁnd that a historical simulation method, which is commonly
used in practice, produces the best results. A parametric and non-parametric VAR
model perform reasonably well, but their performance trails that of the historical
simulation method.A Inﬂuence functions for value-at-risk and expected shortfall 53
A Inﬂuence functions for value-at-risk and expected
shortfall
Let Ft denote the distribution of the one-day hedge error E1
t. The inﬂuence functions
of value-at-risk and expected shortfall are then given by:
1. Value-at-risk: In the case of VaRp the inﬂuence function Ψ(Ft)i sg i v e nb y
ΨVaR (Ft)=



































































2 . (3.28)Chapter 4
Model Risk and Regulatory
Capital
4.1 Introduction
Due to the growing complexity of ﬁnancial markets, ﬁnancial institutions rely more
and more on the use of models to assess the risks to which they are exposed. The
accuracy of these risk assessments depends crucially on the extent to which a market
can be reliably modeled. Choosing an appropriate model to compute market risk
measures is an important and diﬃcult task. It is a widespread feeling among both
academics and practitioners that, although some models do a better job than others,
the search for one ultimate model is futile. An approach that takes the limitations
of our knowledge into account is to develop models—depending on the application
(pricing, hedging, ...) — that capture the most important aspects of a particular
market, and to somehow control for the fact that the assessment of risk is based on
a possibly misspeciﬁed model (see Derman (1996)).
The hazard of working with a potentially misspeciﬁed model is called model risk.
Currently no explicit capital requirements are set by regulators in connection with
model risk. This is done indirectly using the so called multiplication factors. How-
ever, the Basel Committee has indicated that it plans to expand the current capital
adequacy framework to improve the charting of risks to which ﬁnancial institutions
are exposed (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999)). In particular,
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the Committee intends to set capital requirements for operational risk, which is of-
ten taken to consist for an important part of model risk (see Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision (2003)). Just as the 1996 Amendment of the Basel Commit-
tee stimulated ﬁnancial institutions to reﬁne their market risk models, banks are
likely to make more detailed assessments of model risk after incorporation of model
risk regulation in the Basel Accord. As part of their internal risk management sys-
tems, most large ﬁnancial institutions already set aside reserves for model risk (the
so-called model reserves). This means that booking of certain proﬁts on trades is
postponed if it is felt that these proﬁts are sensitive to the model used.
The aim of this paper is to provide a quantitative basis for the incorporation
of model risk in regulatory capital requirements. The same framework may also
be used for the computation of model reserves in the context of internal risk man-
agement procedures within ﬁnancial institutions; in addition, the method may be
used in margin setting by clearing house exchanges, or as a pricing tool. To extend
the current practice of computing market risk measures on the basis of some given
(“nominal”) model, we determine a set of plausible alternative models. In recogni-
tion of the fact that each of these models is a (reasonable) candidate for representing
reality, we propose to compute a worst-case market risk measure over some set of
alternative models. Model risk is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between this mea-
sure and the market risk measure computed from the nominal model. Using sets
of alternative models restricted and unrestricted to a model class, we distinguish
between model risk due to estimation error and model risk due to misspeciﬁcation.
Previous studies on model risk have focused on the risk of using incorrect parame-
ter values in a parametric setting, i.e., estimation error (see, for example, Gibson,
Lhabitant, Pistre and Talay (1999), Talay and Zheng (2002), and Bossy, Gibson,
Lhabitant, Pistre, Talay and Zheng (2000)). However, our study suggests that the
leading factor in model risk is often misspeciﬁcation rather than estimation error.
One major area where ﬁnancial models play an important role is the risk manage-
ment of the portfolios of ﬁnancial institutions. We discuss value-at-risk and expected
shortfall when using a simple Gaussian model and a GARCH(1,1) model for port-
folio returns to illustrate the model risk measurement tools. We consider the S&P
500 and USD/GBP exchange rate as investments. The results can be interpreted in4.1 Introduction 57
terms of a multiplication factor that should be applied to account for model risk in a
given market. Our results for these models indicate that about half of the regulatory
capital set by the Basel Committee can be explained in this way when computing
the 1% value-at-risk at a 95% conﬁdence level. We ﬁnd that the model risk due to
misspeciﬁcation is much larger than the model risk due to estimation error.
Another area which relies heavily on ﬁnancial models is constituted by derivatives
trading. For instance, Hull and Suo (2002) investigate the model risk associated with
the calculation of prices and deltas for illiquid exotic options based on an implied-
volatility model that is calibrated using current prices of liquid products. Their
paper clearly demonstrates the presence of model risk in a number of situations.
In a companion paper (see Chapter 5), we assess hedging model risk in derivative
products on the basis of the total hedging error rather than the error in computing
Greeks, and we propose a quantitative measure of model risk that could be used,
for instance, in the determination of model reserves.1 We illustrate the approach for
the Black-Scholes family of option pricing models. The results indicate that also in
this setting model risk due to misspeciﬁcation is much larger than the model risk
due to estimation error.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
give an overview of market risk measurement. We discuss some of the popular
risk measures with some emphasis on coherent market risk measurement which ﬁts
neatly with the model risk measurement method proposed in Section 4.2. In Section
4.3 we propose a general framework for incorporation of model risk. This is based
on a worst-case analysis. A decomposition of model risk in a parametric and a
nonparametric part is proposed. Section 4.4 provides an application to portfolio
risk management. We discuss the value-at-risk and the expected shortfall approach.
Finally, Section 4.5 concludes.
1Steps towards the quantiﬁcation of model risk for derivative contracts have been taken by
Green and Figlewski (1999), who show that the risk of trading derivative securities can be decreased
substantially by delta hedging. We follow this line of thought by considering the risk of derivative
products in combination with a given hedging strategy. The proposed methodology encompasses
the methodology proposed by Hull and Suo (2002). Furthermore, robustness issues as treated by
El Karoui, Jeanblanc-Picqu´ e and Shreve (1998) ﬁt into the proposed setup.58 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
4.2 Market Risk Measurement
By market risk we understand the risk caused by random ﬂuctuations in future asset
prices. For each given position, the most basic question that a risk manager must
be able to answer is whether or not the risk associated to this position is acceptable.
This qualitative decision is often based on the computation of a risk measure which
in some way represents the “distance to (un)acceptability”. Such a risk measure
may, for instance, be arrived at as follows. Since, in the context of ﬁnance, risk is
usually measured in terms of a univariate distribution (proﬁt/loss), an unacceptable
position can be made acceptable if enough of a suitable “sweetener” is added.2 The
amount of sweetener that has to be added to make a given position just acceptable
is a natural measure of the distance to acceptability.
4.2.1 Use of market risk measures
Market risk measures may be used for a number of diﬀerent purposes.
1. Regulatory capital requirements for securities ﬁrms and banks are computed
on the basis of risk measures. Speciﬁcally, the value-at-risk method has been
adopted by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a).
2. Some banks set reserves for trading desks as part of their internal risk man-
agement procedures. The size of the reserve is coupled to some measure of the
riskiness of the positions taken by the desk.
3. Exchanges need to guarantee the promises to all parties involved in a contract.
To guarantee these promises they use clearing margins for their members. For
example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and many other exchanges
use SPAN to determine the clearing margins. For more detailed information,
see Artzner et al. (1999) and SPAN (1995).
4. Market risk measures may also be used as pricing tools, since they can be used
to compare diﬀerent risks so that good deals can be identiﬁed. This point of
2For the “sweetener” one can think of 1) a premium in pricing applications, 2) capital reserve
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view is elaborated, for instance, in Cochrane and Sa´ a-Requejo (2000), Jaschke
and K¨ uchler (2001) and Carr, Geman and Madan (2001).
4.2.2 Notation and deﬁnitions
Since in this paper we are interested in model risk, we will be working with classes
of models rather than with a single model. It is not always convenient to use the
same probability space for each of these models. Therefore, we start by a formal
description of a setting that allows the use of multiple probability spaces.
Deﬁnition 4.1 A model is a probability space (Ω,F,P).
One could imagine more elaborate probabilistic settings; in particular, a ﬁltration
might be assumed given. However, the above notion will be suﬃcient for the pur-
poses of this paper. For any model m,l e tR(m) denote the space of equivalence
classes of measurable real-valued functions on (Ω,F).
Deﬁnition 4.2 Let a model m be given. A risk deﬁned on m is an element of
R(m).
This deﬁnition, in which a “risk” is a random variable deﬁned on a given probability
space, follows the terminology of Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000). We
introduce a similar concept for model classes rather than for individual models.
Deﬁnition 4.3 Let M be a class of models. A product deﬁned on M is a mapping
that assigns to each model m ∈Ma risk deﬁned on m. The set of all products
deﬁned on M is denoted by X(M).
The risk induced by a product Π on a model m will be denoted by Πm.S i n c e
R(m) is a vector space, the set of products X(M) has the structure of a vector
space as well. For instance, if Π1 and Π2 are products deﬁned on the same class of
models M,t h e nΠ 1 +Π 2 is the product that associates to a model m in M the risk
(Π1)m+(Π2)m. Similarly, we can also deﬁne products relative to a reference product
(if the reference product is nonzero), and we have a partial ordering on products.
We now proceed to risk measures, starting with the deﬁnition for an individual
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Deﬁnition 4.4 Let a model m be given. A risk measure deﬁned on m is a map
from R(m)t oI R∪{ ∞ } .3
Deﬁnition 4.5 Let a class of models M be given. A risk measurement method
deﬁned on M is a mapping that assigns to each model m ∈Mar i s km e a s u r e
deﬁned on m.
Risk measures can be used to separate acceptable from unacceptable risks in the
following way.
Deﬁnition 4.6 Let a model m be given, and let ρ be a risk measure deﬁned on m.
The acceptance set associated with ρ is the set
Aρ = {X ∈R (m) | ρ(X) ≤ 0}. (4.1)
So far we did not discuss speciﬁc properties for risk measures and related notions
that would justify the nomenclature. We come to this in the next section.
4.2.3 Popular risk measurement methods and their proper-
ties
Most risk measures used in practice can be viewed as risk measurement methods in
the formal sense of the previous section. Due to its prominent role in the amendment
of 1996 by the Basel Committee, the value-at-risk approach is currently the most
popular method used in risk measurement (see, for example, Duﬃe and Pan (1997),
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996a), Dowd (1998), and Risk Magazine
(1996)). A formal description of VaR may be given as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.7 (Value at Risk (VaR)) Let a model class M be given. The value-
at-risk method with reference asset N ∈X (M)a n dlevel p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a
model m =( Ω ,F,P) ∈Mthe risk measure VaRm given by
VaRm : R(m)   X  →−inf {q ∈ IR : P(X/Nm ≤ q) ≥ p}∈IR ∪{ ∞ } . (4.2)
3Including ∞ allows risks to be deﬁned on more general probability spaces, see Delbaen (2000).4.2 Market Risk Measurement 61
We now list a number of properties that risk measures and risk measurement meth-
ods may satisfy. We start with individual models. So, let a model m be given, and
let ρ be a risk measure deﬁned on m.S i n c e m will be ﬁxed for the moment, we
write R(m)s i m p l ya sR. Some properties of interest will be stated as axioms. In
the ﬁrst axiom we also assume that a reference risk N ∈Rhas been given.
Axiom 4.1 (Translation invariance) For all X ∈Rand τ ∈ IR, we have ρ(X +
τN)=ρ(X) − τ.
Adding (subtracting) an initial investment of size τ in the reference asset N decreases
(increases) the risk measure ρ by τ. Therefore, τ can be interpreted as the amount
of the sweetener added to the risk X to make it more acceptable (or less, in case τ
is negative).
Axiom 4.2 (Monotonicity) For all X and Y ∈Rwith X ≤ Y ,w eh a v eρ(X) ≥
ρ(Y ).
It seems natural to assign a higher value to risks that always have a lower payoﬀ.
Note that the axiom of monotonicity rules out the commonly used mean-variance
measure ρ(X)=−IE P(X)+γVarP (X), where γ is a risk aversion parameter. The
VaR measure, on the other hand, is monotonic.
Axiom 4.3 (Positive homogeneity) For all X ∈Rand λ ≥ 0, ρ(λX)=λρ(X).
Again, this axiom is satisﬁed by VaR. The homogeneity axiom may be considered
reasonable as a local approximation, or when size eﬀects (due, for instance, to liq-
uidity risk or to regulatory constraints) are taken into account in the future net
worth of a position.
Axiom 4.4 (Subadditivity) For all X and Y ∈R ,w eh a v eρ(X+Y ) ≤ ρ(X)+ρ(Y ).
If the risk measure ρ satisﬁes the subadditivity property, the risk manager/supervisor
is sure that the sum of two separate risks X and Y can be estimated conservatively
by the sum of the risk measures of the separate risks. If a risk measure does not
satisfy the subadditivity property, a risk might be disguised by splitting it up. The62 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
VaR measure does not satisfy the subadditivity property (see Artzner et al. (1999)
for a counterexample).
In some situations the risk of a portfolio might be increasing in a nonlinear way
with the position size (for example due to increasing liquidity risk). This led F¨ ollmer
and Schied (2002) to introduce the axiom of convexity.
Axiom 4.5 (Convexity) For all X and Y ∈R ,a n dλ ∈ [0,1], we have ρ(λX +(1−
λ)Y ) ≤ λρ(X)+( 1− λ)ρ(Y ).
Convexity means that diversiﬁcation does not increase risk.
The above axioms can be transferred to risk measurement methods in a straight-
forward way. We shall say that a risk measurement method RMM deﬁned on a model
class M satisﬁes Axiom i (i =1 ,...,5 ) if for each m ∈Mthe risk measure RMMm
on m satisﬁes Axiom i with R = R(m). In the case of the translation invariance
axiom, it is assumed that a reference product in X(M)i sg i v e n .
The fact that VaR does not satisfy the subadditivity or convexity property is
often seen as a disadvantage of this risk measurement method; see Artzner et al.
(1999) and Acerbi and Tasche (2002) for a more extensive discussion. Alternative
risk measures have been proposed that do satisfy the desirable subadditivity prop-
erty. Artzner et al. (1997) introduced the notion of coherent risk measures. Their
ideas were formalized in Artzner et al. (1999), Artzner (1999), and Delbaen (2000).
Deﬁnition 4.8 A coherent risk measure is a risk measure that satisﬁes the axioms
of translation invariance, monotonicity, subadditivity, and positive homogeneity.
Deﬁnition 4.9 A convex risk measure is a risk measure that satisﬁes the axioms
of translation invariance, monotonicity, and convexity.
The above deﬁnitions can immediately be extended to produce the notion of a
coherent risk measurement method and a convex risk measurement method, respec-
tively.
The ﬁve axioms still allow many measurement methods, so even when one decides
to use a coherent or convex measure one needs further considerations to arrive at a
speciﬁc method. An example of a coherent risk measurement method is the worst4.3 Model risk 63
conditional expectation (WCE). Contrary to VaR, this measure takes the size of
losses under the VaR limit into account. Therefore, it is not possible to increase
the expected return of a portfolio under WCE restrictions by taking extremely risky
bets with a very low probability of a very high loss.
Deﬁnition 4.10 (Worst Conditional Expectation (WCE)) Let a model class M be
given. The worst conditional expectation method with reference product N ∈X(M)
and level p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model m =( Ω ,F,P) ∈Mthe risk measure WCEm
given by
WCEm : R(m)   X  →−infA∈F, P(A)>p IE P [X/Nm | A] ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } . (4.3)
It is a straightforward exercise to show that WCE satisﬁes the axioms of translation
invariance, monotonicity, positive homogeneity, and subadditivity. Though WCE
has nice theoretical implications, it is diﬃcult to compute in practice. A practically
usable coherent risk measure is the expected shortfall as given in Acerbi and Tasche
(2002).
Deﬁnition 4.11 (expected shortfall (ES)) The expected shortfall method with ref-
erence asset N and level p ∈ (0,1) assigns to a model m =( Ω ,F,P) the risk measure
ESm given by





+Qp (X/Nm)(p − P(X/Nm ≤ Qp (X/Nm)))) ∈ IR ∪{ ∞ } . (4.4)
4.3 Model risk
Market risk measures are typically based on a class of scenarios together with a
base probability measure; both items are provided by a model m. At a higher level,
however, there is uncertainty about which model to use. A ﬁnancial institution’s
perception of market risk can deviate substantially from the actual market risk
due to the fact that the actual dynamics are insuﬃciently represented by the model
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risks that it would ﬁnd unacceptable in case it would know the actual dynamics.
The risk associated to the mismatch between model dynamics and actual dynamics
is called model risk.
In the sequel we propose a framework to quantify this model risk. Since the
true dynamics are unknown, it makes sense to form a set of alternative dynamics
K (containing a nominal model m) which is likely to contain the true dynamics. A
natural candidate for a model risk measure is the diﬀerence between the worst-case
risk measure among all models in the neighborhood K and the risk measure under
the dynamics of the nominal model m. If the market risk measurement method
is translation invariant, the diﬀerence between these two quantities gives the extra
position in the reference product which has to be added to the market risk measure of
the nominal model to make the risk acceptable, even under the worst case dynamics.
In the next section, this intuition is formalized.
4.3.1 Measuring model risk
Suppose that the ﬁnancial institution uses a risk measurement method RMM to
assess the acceptability of a product (portfolio) Π. In model m, the risk of the
product Π is computed as RMMm(Πm). To take into account model uncertainty, we
take a set of alternative dynamics K around m and compute the worst-case market
risk measure (with respect to K), which is given by supk∈K RMMk(Πk). Model risk
may now be quantiﬁed as follows.
Deﬁnition 4.12 (Model risk measure)4 Let M be a class of models, let m be a
model in M,a n dl e tK be a subset of M containing m. Furthermore, let Π be a
product deﬁned on M and let RMM be a risk measurement method satisfying the
axiom of translation invariance for M.T h e model risk associated to the method
RMM of product Π, with respect to the nominal model m and the tolerance set K,
is given by
φRMM(Π,m,K) = supk∈K RMMk(Πk) − RMMm(Πm). (4.5)
4The case where RMMm(Πm)=∞ is uninteresting since the ﬁnancial institution will never
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Artzner et al. (1999), Delbaen (2000), F¨ ollmer and Schied (2002), and others use
one particular model m to compute the market risk measure RMMm(Πm). With the
deﬁnition above we extend their risk measurement framework by including model
risk. The amount φRMM(Π,m,K) can be thought of as a model reserve that should
be held to cover the worst-case dynamics of K. This interpretation depends on
the translation invariance axiom of the risk measurement method which is therefore
crucial in the deﬁnition. Consider, for example, value-at-risk. From empirical data
we can determine whether the VaR limit given by a nominal model is exceeded as
often as predicted or more often. If the model is accurate in predicting the VaR limit
we would like to set a small model reserve. On the other hand, we want to set a large
model reserve in case the model does a poor job predicting the VaR limit. Adding the
model reserve φRMM(Π,m,K) to the nominal market risk measure RMMm(Πm)g i v e s
a total risk measure equal to supk∈K RMMk(Πk). In appendix 4.3.2 we illustrate the
procedure for coherent risk measures, in particular, the WCE and SPAN. The size
of the model reserve (and thereby the total risk measure) is controlled by the size
of K. In the next section, we discuss the determination of K and the dependence of
the model reserve on model accuracy in more detail.
The model risk measure that we have deﬁned may have some desirable properties
depending on the market risk measurement method from which it has been derived.
Of the properties of the risk measurement method chosen translation invariance is
of special importance. It allows for the intuitive invariance property of the model
risk measure.
Theorem 4.1 (Invariance) Let RMM be a risk measurement method that is trans-
lation invariant with respect to a reference product N. Then the model risk measure
associated to RMM is invariant in the sense that
φRMM(Π + τN,m,K)=φRMM(Π,m,K) (4.6)
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Proof. Take τ ∈ IR. We have
φRMM(Π + τN,m,K) = supk∈K RMMk (Πk + τNk) − RMMm (Πm + τNm)
=s u p k∈K RMMk (Πk) − τ − RMMm (Πm)+τ
= φRMM(Π,m,K).
The addition of a constant payoﬀ should not alter the model risk, since it is model
independent. Another way to look at it is that the constant payoﬀ can be fully
hedged by a position in the reference product. In a similar way, one can easily
prove that for positive homogeneous RMM the model risk measure is positively
homogeneous.
The model risk measure does not, in general, satisfy the monotonicity, subaddi-
tivity, and convexity property. However, if the underlying market risk measurement
method satisﬁes any of these properties, these properties hold for what might be
called total market risk, viz. the sum of nominal market risk and model risk. For
example, in case of subadditivity, this can be seen from the fact that total mar-
ket risk is given by the formula supk∈K RMMk(Πk), and from the general fact that
supi(ai+bi) ≤ supi(ai)+supi(bi). As noted above, the reason why market risk mea-
sures are often required to be subadditive is to prevent companies, trading desks,
etc. from covering up large risks by splitting them into separate positions that do
satisfy the risk criteria. If total market risk is reported, then subadditivity of this
risk measure is suﬃcient for this.
We choose a worst-case approach to quantify model risk. An alternative would
be a Bayesian approach, in which the model risk measure is a weighted average of
risk measures according to some prior. Depending on its risk attitude, the ﬁnancial
institution can give more weight to unfavorable dynamics. However, the choice of a
prior is diﬃcult and arbitrary. In a worst-case approach, one only needs to specify
the tolerance set K; this may be seen as an acknowledgment of the restrictions of
statistical modeling in the face of limited data and limited understanding of the true
dynamics.4.3 Model risk 67
4.3.2 Model risk for popular risk measures
In this section we illustrate the model risk measure for coherent risk measures and,
in particular, the worst conditional expectation and SPAN.
A coherent risk measure method ρm for model m =( Ω ,F,P) can be written in
the form5
ρm (Π) = supQ∈P(m) IE Q [Π].
Diﬀerent choices of P (m) produce diﬀerent risk measures. We specify P (m) for
WCE and SPAN.
Example 4.1 (WCE) Given is a model m with a base probability P, m =( Ω ,F,P).
The class of models P (m)i sg i v e nb y
PWCE (m)={P(. | A) | P(A) >α }.
Example 4.2 (SPAN) Given is a model m with a base probability P, m =( Ω ,F,P),





The SPAN method is such that6
PSPAN (m) ⊂{ Q | Q << P}.
Note the diﬀerence between P (m)a n dK in Def. 4.12. P (m) is a set of probability
measures based on one base probability measure P to compute a coherent market
risk measure. However, K denotes a set of models. The models in this set can have
diﬀerent measurable spaces and diﬀerent base probability measures. The model risk
measure for a general coherent risk measure is then given by
φRMM(Π,m,K) = supk∈K supQ∈P(k) IE Q [Π] − supQ∈P(m) IE Q [Π].
5For simplicity we use the deﬁnition given by Artzner et al. (1999). The deﬁnition for general
probability spaces is given in Delbaen (2000).
6Of course, any probability measure P∗ equivalent to P could serve as a base probability measure
for PSPAN (see SPAN (1995) for details or Artzner et al. (1999) for a summary).68 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
4.3.3 Decomposition of Model Risk
The exposition given in section 4.3.1 was rather general. We did not specify a
model m or a set of alternative models K. In this section we discuss some possible
choices for the set of alternative dynamics K. In practice, one starts with a (usually
parametric) model class, say M(Θ) ≡{ (Ω,F,Pθ):θ ∈ Θ}⊂M , where Θ denotes
the parameter space.7 Using an estimation or calibration procedure, a particular
element m(ˆ θ) is chosen from M(Θ). Even if the actual dynamics, say m0,b e l o n gt o
the parametric model class M(Θ), that is m0 = m(θ0) for some θ0 ∈ Θ, the ﬁnancial
institution faces the risk of selecting the wrong element m(ˆ θ). This risk is called
model risk due to estimation error. To deﬁne a neighborhood of plausible values
around m(ˆ θ), one typically uses conﬁdence regions. Speciﬁcally, we can place a
conﬁdence region around the estimator ˆ θ for θ0 to deﬁne some neighborhood around
m(ˆ θ). Depending on a chosen level α we take a (1 − α) conﬁdence region around
ˆ θ.8 In this way we arrive at a set of alternative models of the following form:
K(α)=
 
m(θ) ∈M(Θ) : θ ∈ CI1−α(ˆ θ)
 
(4.7)
In situations where one is interested in a speciﬁc market risk measurement method
RMM and a speciﬁc product Π, an alternative approach which focuses more directly
on the given situation is to use the set K deﬁned by
K(α)=
 









   
.
(4.8)
We deﬁne model risk due to estimation error,o rs i m p l yestimation risk, as the model
risk that is obtained from a tolerance set derived from conﬁdence regions in within
the model class.
Now let us consider the situation where the actual dynamics may not belong to
M(Θ). The risks that we are considering are real-valued random variables and so a
natural idea is to work on the basis of the associated distribution functions. Suppose
that a cumulative distribution function ˆ F(x) has been obtained by some nonpara-
metric estimation method. This allows us to deﬁne a tolerance set K depending on
7In the usual parametric case the parameter space is a subset of IR
k.
8CI1−α(ˆ θ) denotes the (1 − α)-conﬁdence interval for θ0.4.3 Model risk 69
conﬁdence level α in the following way:
K(α)=CI1−α (ˆ m): =
 
m =( Ω ,F,P):F (x)=P((−∞,x]) ∈
 







where kα/2 is the critical value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic.9 As above, one
may also deﬁne tolerance sets that are more speciﬁcally tied to a given risk measure-
ment method and a given product. Along this line, one may estimate RMMm (Πm)
ﬁrst and deﬁne a tolerance set based on a conﬁdence region CI1−α for the estimate
K(α)={m :R M M m (Πm) ∈ CI1−α}.
In general, we can determine tolerance sets that are restricted to a (parametric)
subclass M(Θ) or that are not restricted to such a model class (which we will refer
to as unrestricted, in the sequel). As above, one may deﬁne model risk due to
estimation error as the model risk restricted to the model class M(Θ). The amount
that has to be added to arrive at the model risk determined from the unrestricted
method may be termed model risk due to misspeciﬁcation or simply misspeciﬁcation
risk. In other words, if Kr is the restricted tolerance set and Ku is the unrestricted
one, then we deﬁne the misspeciﬁcation risk for a given product Π as
φRMM (Π,Kr, Ku) = supk∈Ku RMMk (Πk) − supk∈Kr RMMk (Πk). (4.9)
However, the quantity deﬁned above may in some cases be less than zero, whereas
we would prefer to deﬁne misspeciﬁcation risk in such a way that it is always non-
negative. To achieve this with the above deﬁnition, we have to make sure that the
set Kr is nested in Ku. In case the misspeciﬁcation risk in (4.9) turns out to be
negative, one could argue that that the unrestricted set Ku is too small, i.e., based
upon too low a conﬁdence level. Therefore, we use a family {Ku(γ)} of tolerance
sets parameterized by the conﬁdence level γ. For a given conﬁdence level α and
a given tolerance set Kr, which may have been selected on the basis of the same
9Formally, the use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic requires (Ω,F) to be model independent.
For the empirical applications we have in mind, this is not a restriction. Alternative uniform
conﬁdence bounds around a nonparametric distribution may be obtained from the Cram´ er-von
Mises statistic or the Kuiper statistic (see, for example, Shorack and Wellner (1986)).70 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
conﬁdence level, we then take Ku = Ku(β)w h e r eβ is deﬁned by10
β =m i n ( α,sup{γ ∈ (0,1) : Kr ∈K u (γ)}). (4.10)
The analogs of Theorem4.1 (invariance) and positive homogeneity can easily be
shown to hold for both estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk separately. Proofs
follow the lines of the proofs of the cited results.
4.4 Regulatory Capital
One of the most important tasks of a risk management department is to compute
the risk of the portfolio of the ﬁnancial institution. In this section we illustrate
how the methodology can be used in portfolio risk management, using two ﬁnancial
time series, the Standard and Poor’s 500 and the £/ $ exchange rate. The data
were obtained from Thomson Datastream (deﬁnitions and sources of the data can
be found in Appendix B).
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has suggested to set risk-based cap-
ital requirements which are closely related to the value-at-risk methodology. Here,
we show ﬁrst how the model risk measurement approach can be taken into account
for a (simple) value-at-risk methodology, followed by an example using the expected
shortfall. The derivation of the formulas and the asymptotic distributions used in
these examples are presented in Appendix A.
4.4.1 Examples
Example 4.3 Value-at-Risk






of the portfolio under consid-
eration for a period of length nT years (nT = 20, T =1 /252 (one day)). An
elementary VaR model assumes that the data is a realization of a random sample
10An alternative way to ensure nesting is to form convex combinations. Note that, in a context
in which we are concerned with a speciﬁc product, it is reasonable to identify models with the
cumulative distribution functions induced by the given product, and in this way it is indeed possible
to consider convex combinations of models. The nesting property can then be guaranteed by
replacing the set Ku by the convex hull of Kr and the original Ku. However, our proposal seems







j ∼N(µT,σ2T) for j =1 ,..,n where µ and σ2 denote an-











i − ˆ µ). Let θ =( µ,σ). The model class M, with typical ele-




, belongs to the class
of lognormal distributions.
Let X0 ∈ IR denote the (model independent) initial capital, and let Π ∈X(M)
denote the portfolio at time T. To compute the worst cases, we follow the approach
of focusing directly on the given risk measurement method (VaR in this case) and
the given product, as discussed in 4.3.3 above.
First, assume that asset returns are normally distributed and let ˆ θ =( ˆ µ, ˆ σ)b e
the estimate of the parameter θ =( µ,σ). We shall call m(ˆ θ)t h enominal parametric












where zp denotes the pth quantile of the (standard) normal distribution. Still assum-
ing normality of asset returns, the parametric worst-case value-at-risk is the lower




. This lower bound
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Nonparametric versions of VaR may be computed on the basis of the empirical
distribution function, Fn.W e d e n o t e b y mn the model (IR,B(IR),Pn)w h e r ePn is














and  a  is the largest integer
that is less than or equal to a. Finally, the worst-case empirical VaR is the lower72 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
bound of the (nonparametric) conﬁdence interval around VaRmn (Πmn), which may
be computed as






where β is as deﬁned in (4.10) and where f (x) can be estimated using, for instance,
the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel estimator.11
Example 4.4 Expected Shortfall
For the empirical part we use expected shortfall as well as value-at-risk, so we repeat
the exercise of the previous example for ES. Assume the same setting as before. The








































































The empirical ES can be computed by
ESmn (Πmn)=−
1
















11In our applications below we have approximately normal data and so we do bandwidth se-
lection by taking h =1 .06sn−1/5, which is the optimal bandwidth in case of a normal N
 
µ,σ2 
distribution, where s denotes the usual estimate for σ.4.4 Regulatory Capital 73







S&P 500 x normal










GB Pound / US Dollar x normal





GB Pound / US dollar N(s=0.00639)
Figure 4.1: Data descriptions
QQ-plot and density comparison of the normal density with nonparametric density
estimate (using a the Rosenblatt-Parzen kernel estimator with Gaussian kernel and
bandwidth h =1 .06sn−1/5) of the daily (total) returns of the S&P 500 and £/$
exchange rate. The data periods are 26-10-’81 – 29-04-’03 for the S&P 500 and
03-01-’86 – 29-04-’03 for the £ / $ exchange rate.
The empirical worst-case ES can be computed as





























ESmn (Πmn)V aR mn (Πmn).74 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
4.4.2 Empirical results
Based on these examples, we now illustrate the methodology. In addition to the
Gaussian models described in the examples we also investigate a GARCH(1,1) model
with Gaussian innovations that should be more capable of capturing time varying
risk.12 Figure 4.1 shows the normal density with variance equal to the sample
variances of the S&P 500 data and the British pound / US dollar (£/$) exchange
rate data and compares this with a nonparametric density13 estimate of the densities
of the S&P 500 and the £/$ exchange rate. We see that the returns from the S&P 500
and an investment in British money market (for a US investor) account exhibit more
kurtosis than could be expected on the basis of normally distributed returns. This
could be the result of time-varying volatility and, therefore, we use rolling window
versions of our models with a window of 2 years. Based on the graphical analysis
of Figure 4.1, we expect some misspeciﬁcation error when calculating the value-
at-risk and expected shortfall on the basis of a nominal model assuming normally
distributed returns.
Figure 4.2 shows the estimators for the (annualized) mean and volatility of both
models. We see that both models predict more or less the same means. The dif-
ference between the models is in the predictions of the volatilities. The predictions
of the GARCH(1,1) model are as expected much more erratic than those of the
Gaussian model.
Next, we investigate the performance of the various models for VaR and ES from
a statistical point of view. We start by investigating VaR. Ideally, the frequency of
excessive losses (FOEL), i.e., the number of days at which the loss exceeds the
predicted VaR, should be close to the VaR levels. As a benchmark we choose the
1% level for VaR, since this is the quantile required by BIS (see Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (1996a)). In Tables 4.1 and 4.2 we present the results of a
one-sided FOEL test with 95% conﬁdence intervals. We denote by n the number of
12Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) ﬁnd that an ARMA(1,1)-GARCH(1,1) model with Gaussian
innovations does a good job in forecasting value-at-risk for their portfolios of actual investment
banks. Since we did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant ARMA structure in our data, we restricted
the model to a GARCH(1,1). For more advanced volatility estimation methods see, for example,
Eberlein, Kallsen and Kristen (2003).
13In view of the approximate normality of the data, the bandwidth h has been set equal to
h =1 .06ˆ σn−1/5 which is the optimal bandwidth selection for normally distributed data.4.4 Regulatory Capital 75
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Figure 4.2: Parameter estimates
The upper panel displays the parameter estimates of the mean and volatility in the
S&P 500 market for both the Gaussian and the GARCH(1,1) model. The lower
panel displays the parameter estimates of the mean and volatility in the £/$ FX
rate market for both the Gaussian and the GARCH(1,1) model. For both markets
the estimates are using two-year rolling window models. The data runs from 26-10-
’81−29-04-’03 for the S&P 500 market and from 03-01-’86−29-04-’03.76 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
Table 4.1: FOEL test VaR for S&P 500
FOEL test for Gaussian VaR, GARCH(1,1) VaR, and non-parametric VaR models
and their worst-case equivalents (for deﬁnitions, see main text). Daily data on S&P
500 (total return) index from 26-10-’81 to 29-04-’03.
model
VaR




Gauss. 2.5% 3.2% (2.7%;−)2 .90 .00 yes
Gauss. wc 2.5% 2.6% (2.1%;−)0 .37 0.35 no
GARCH(1,1) 2.5% 3.3% (2.8%;−)3 .10 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) wc 2.5% 3.3% (2.8%;−)3 .10 .00 yes
NP 2.5% 3.1% (2.6%;−)2 .30 .01 yes
NP wc 2.5% 2.1% (1.7%;−) −1.90 .97 no
Gauss. 1% 2.0% (1.6%;−)5 .20 .00 yes
Gauss. wc 1% 1.7% (1.4%;−)3 .60 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) 1% 2.0% (1.6%;−)5 .20 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) wc 1% 1.7% (1.6%;−)5 .10 .00 yes
NP 1% 1.6% (1.2%;−)3 .30 .00 yes
NP wc 1% 1.0% (0.7%;−) −0.45 0.67 no
days in the backtesting period, by f the number of times the VaR level has been
exceeded, and by 1 − p the predicted level of VaR (2.5% or 1% in our case). The







The results indicate that the Gaussian rolling window and GARCH(1,1) VaR
models are strongly rejected both in case of the S&P 500 data and in case of the £/$
data. For both the S&P 500 and the £/$ exchange rate, taking estimation risk into
account seems suﬃcient in case of the 2.5% level for the Gaussian model. In case of
the 1% level, however, taking estimation risk into account does not prevent the VaR
limit from being exceeded too often. If we take misspeciﬁcation risk into account
by looking at the non parametric worst-case model, the number of times the VaR
limit is crossed does not exceed the level predicted by the model in a statistically
signiﬁcant way.4.4 Regulatory Capital 77
Table 4.2: FOEL test VaR for £/ $ FX rate
FOEL test for Gaussian VaR, GARCH(1,1) VAR, and non-parametric VaR models
and their worst-case equivalents (for deﬁnitions, see main text). Daily data on £/
$ from 03-01-’86 to 29-04-’03.
model
VaR




Gauss. 2.5% 3.3% (2.7%;−)2 .70 .00 yes
Gauss. wc 2.5% 2.8% (1.2%;−)1 .00 .15 no
GARCH(1,1) 2.5% 3.3% (2.7%;−)2 .60 .01 yes
GARCH(1,1) wc 2.5% 3.2% (2.6%;−)2 .50 .01 yes
NP 2.5% 2.6% (2.1%;−)0 .30 .40 no
NP wc 2.5% 1.6% (1.2%;−) −4.91 .00 no
Gauss. 1% 1.8% (1.4%;−)3 .80 .00 yes
Gauss. wc 1% 3.3% (0.9%;−)1 .50 .06 no
GARCH(1,1) 1% 2.0% (1.6%;−)4 .60 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) wc 1% 1.9% (1.5%;−)4 .40 .00 yes
NP 1% 1.1% (0.8%;−)0 .40 .33 no
NP wc 1% 0.5% (0.3%;−) −3.91 .00 no
In order to test the performance of the models for predicting expected shortfall,
we use the recently proposed test for expected shortfall in Chapter 2. For ES we
adopt a higher level, namely, the 2.5% level, following arguments given in Chapter 2,
which motivate that for an appropriate comparison between VaR and ES, the latter
should have a higher level. In order to apply the ES test, the return series {ht}n
t=1
is transformed using a probability integral transform to a standardized return series
{yt}n
t=1 which have distributions, {Qt}n
t=1, which under the null hypothesis that the









−1 (Pt (ht)), (4.21)
where {Pt}n
t=1 denotes the cdf of the model forecast distributions (N(µt,σ t)i nt h e
case of the Gaussian and GARCH(1,1) model, where µt and σt are model speciﬁc).78 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
Table 4.3: ES tests
Test of expected shortfall for the nominal Gaussian and GARCH(1,1) and the nom-
inal non-parametric ES model (for deﬁnitions, see main text). The four upper rows
present the results of the S&P 500 and the four bottom rows represent the results
of the £/ $ FX rate. Daily data on the S&P 500 (total return) index from 26-10-’81






S&P 500 Gauss. 5% −13.50 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) 5% −12.60 .00 yes
NP 5% −0.80 .22 no
Gauss. 2.5% −19.50 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) 2.5% −17.60 .00 yes
NP 2.5% −0.60 .28 no
£/ $ Gauss. 5% −7.30 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) 5% −9.80 .00 yes
NP 5% 1.00 .84 no
Gauss. 2.5% −9.50 .00 yes
GARCH(1,1) 2.5% −13.00 .00 yes
NP 2.5% 1.58 0.94 no







where V , calculated under the null hypothesis, is given by
V =1 /p − (1 − 1/p
2)z
2
p +( 1+1 /p)φ(zp)zp/p − φ
2(zp)/p
2. (4.23)
The results indicate that both the rolling window Gaussian model and the GARCH(1,1)
model are strongly rejected. The rolling-window nonparametric model cannot be
rejected for both series. Since the worst-case non-parametric expected-shortfall is
below the nominal non-parametric expected shortfall, it serves as a lower bound.15
14For convenience, contrary to deﬁnition 4.4, we write ES as a function of the distribution
function.
15We did not report any results of tests for the worst-case variants of the models for expected
shortfall. In order to perform these tests one needs to make assumptions about the tail behavior
(for example, a shift in all tail observations.)4.4 Regulatory Capital 79
One way to investigate the relation between the worst-case risk measure and
the risk measure based on the nominal models is in terms of a multiplication fac-
tor. We deﬁne the multiplication factor for VaR or ES as the ratio between the
non-parametric worst-case VaR (ES) based on a 95% conﬁdence interval and the
nominal parametric VaR (ES). Plots of the multiplication factors for the Gaussian
and GARCH(1,1) models are shown in Figure 4.3. Our deﬁnition of the model risk
multiplication factors implies that the capital requirements for a bank are the same
irrespective of the nominal model used. This seems reasonable, since the amount
of regulatory capital should depend on the position that the bank takes and not on
the model it uses.
However, the regulator does not know the position of the bank. The information
that the regulator gathers is based on the results reported by the banks. Thus, if
banks use more accurate models, the regulator has more insight in the risks for the
bank and the ﬁnancial system. Therefore, the regulator wants to provide incentives
for the banks to use accurate models. One way to do this is to vary the non-
parametric worst case VaR (ES) depending on the backtest. A scheme providing
these incentives would be: in case of a rejected model based on backtesting banks
should use a model risk multiplication factor based on a (95+penalty)% conﬁdence
interval non-parametric VaR (ES), where the penalty increasing with the degree of
rejection (higher penalties for lower p-values).
We see in the upper panels of Figure 4.3 that for the Gaussian model in case of
1% VaR multiplication factors of 2 for the S&P 500 and 1.6 for the £/$ exchange
rate comfortably cover model risk at the 95% conﬁdence level during the full sample
period. In case of the 2.5% ES we ﬁnd that multiplication factors of 1.7 for the
S&P 500 and 1.5 for the £/$ exchange rate are suﬃcient for the Gaussian model.
The lowest BIS multiplication factor for both VaR and ES, a multiplication factor
of three, would correspond to a conﬁdence level of about 99.99%. In the right panels
of Figure 4.3 we see that for the GARCH(1,1) model the model risk multiplication
factors are much higher than for the Gaussian model. This can be explained by the
fact that the GARCH(1,1) model responds more quickly to periods of low volatility
and then forecasts low values of VaR and ES contrary to the non-parametric worst
case.80 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
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Figure 4.3: Model risk multiplication factors
The upper panels display model risk multiplication factors (on the vertical axis)
of the 1%-VaR and 2.5%-ES for the S&P 500 during the period 26-10-’83 – 29-04-
’03 (left is Gaussian and right GARCH(1,1)). The lower panels display model risk
multiplication factors of the 1%-VaR and 2.5%-ES for the £/ $ FX rate during the
period 03-01-’88 – 29-04-’03 (left is Gaussian and right GARCH(1,1)).4.5 Conclusions 81
In Figures 4.4 and 4.5 we give the capital requirements based on the BIS capital
requirements. All requirements are based on investments of $100 in the market.
Results can therefore be interpreted as percentages. We have used the BIS backtest
procedure (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996b)) to backtest the
Gaussian and the GARCH(1,1) models and to determine the multiplication fac-
tors.16 The capital requirement can then be determined by multiplying the daily
value-at-risks by the multiplication factor and
√
10.17 The capital requirements are
compared to the two-week returns. In addition to the BIS capital requirements we
plot the capital requirements based on the model risk multiplication factors shown
in Figure 4.3. In Figures 4.4 and 4.5 we see that the capital requirements for the
GARCH(1,1) model are much more variable than those of the Gaussian model. Fur-
thermore, we see that in normal market conditions the model reserves based on the
model risk measures cover the losses safely. The performance in terms of number
of exceedances per daily returns, two week returns, and average regulatory capital,
is more or less the same for both models as can be seen from Table 4.4. In Table
4.4 we see that the number of exceedances of the two-week VaR and ES’s is very
small for all capital requirement schemes. Of course, the capital requirements set by
the BIS are exceeded least, but they are also very large compared to the model risk
multiplication factors. Eventually, the regulator needs to make a trade-oﬀ between
the cost of exceedance of the capital requirements and the cost of impeding banks
in their operations by charging high capital requirements.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a framework to set capital requirements for trading
activities in a market, based on the extent to which this market can be reliably
modeled. The framework extends the (market) risk framework set out by Artzner
et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000) by considering risk measurement methods for a
class of models instead of a risk measure for one particular model. This allows for
16Banks only need to do this every three months. However, in this application we did it on a
daily basis in order to mitigate the eﬀect of the timing of these three month periods. The BIS
capital requirements are therefore not precisely those that would result in practice.
17Though the models are backtested using daily VaR, banks should report two-week VaR. The
BIS allows the scaling by
√
10. Under the Gaussian model assumptions this would be correct.82 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital

















Figure 4.4: Capital requirements S&P 500
This ﬁgure compares two losses on the S&P 500 to the capital requirements (on the
vertical axis) are given for a ﬁrm trading in the S&P 500. Given are the capital
requirements using the BIS regulation and the capital requirements based on a 1%-
VaR and 2.5%-ES model risk multiplication factor. The graph is truncated as in
















Figure 4.5: Capital requirements £/ $ FX rate
This ﬁgure compares two losses on the £/ $ FX rate to the capital requirements (on
the vertical axis) are given for a ﬁrm trading in the £/ $ FX rate. Given are the
capital requirements using the BIS regulation and the capital requirements based
on a 1%-VaR and 2.5%-ES model risk multiplication factor.84 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
Table 4.4: Capital requirement schemes
This table reports the 1-day average exceedance rate, two-week average exceedance
rate, and the average capital requirements (CR) the capital requirement schemes.
The CR schemes investigated are the BIS CR for the Gaussian model, the BIS CR
for the GARCH(1,1) model, the VaR model risk multiplication factor based CR,
and the ES model risk multiplication factor based CR. The S&P 500 (for 26-10-’83









S&P 500 BIS Gauss. 0.05 0.05 24.0
BIS GARCH 0.10 0.00 23.0
MRMF VaR 2.52 1.70 9.2
MRMF ES 1.49 1.08 11.0
£/ $ BIS Gauss. 0.00 0.00 14.7
BIS GARCH 0.07 0.07 14.9
MRMF VaR 1.33 0.90 5.9
MRMF ES 1.00 0.70 6.3
a quantiﬁcation of model risk on top of market risk measurement.
The general framework presented is elaborated in such a manner that it ﬁts well
into the capital adequacy framework set out by the Basel Committee and that of
many internal risk management divisions. The use of risk measurement methods
extends the currently used value-at-risk and the recently proposed coherent risk
measures in a natural way.
We decompose the total model risk into a component due to estimation error
and a component due to misspeciﬁcation. This is established using a tolerance set
restricted to a model class in order to quantify estimation risk and an unrestricted
tolerance set to quantify misspeciﬁcation risk. This allows a division of capital
requirements currently used (for example, the multiplication factor of the BIS) in
market risk, model risk (estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk), and residual risks.
Our results suggest that, for commonly used models, a Gaussian and a GARCH(1,1)
model, misspeciﬁcation risk dominates estimation risk. The analysis indicates that
the multiplication factor set by the BIS is conservative if it would only be intended
to cover model risk. In general, the conﬁdence levels chosen by the BIS or any other
regulator need to address the trade-oﬀ between limiting the probability of excessive4.5 Conclusions 85
losses on the one hand and leaving room for operation in the market on the other
hand. Furthermore, besides model risk the multiplication factor set by the BIS
should also cover hard-to-measure risks such as operational risk, legal risk, etc.
Concluding, the framework presented allows regulators to diﬀerentiate their capi-
tal requirements on the basis of the extent to which a market can be reliably modeled
on the basis of state-of-the-art technology. Depending on the performance of the
model used for market risk assessment by the individual bank, model risk reserves
can be determined. A further comparison between markets on the basis of the extent
to which they can be reliably modeled and the determination of the size of model
risk reserves for diﬀerent models is left for future empirical research.86 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
A Risk measure derivations
A.1 Computation of ES
To compute the ES under normality we use some well-known properties of the normal
and lognormal distribution. We can compute the expected shortfall of X when X



























































































Φ(zp − σ) (4.24)
where zp (µ,σ) denotes the p-quantile of the N (µ,σ2) distribution and is given
by zp (µ,σ)=zpσ + µ,w h e r ezp denotes the p-quantile of the standard normal
distribution.
A.2 Asymptotic distribution of VaR and ES
We derive the asymptotic distribution of the VaR and the ES starting with the
parametric case.
Parametric case














j ∼N(µT,σ2T) for j =1 ,..,n. µ denotes the yearly mean, σ2 the yearly
18L(X) denotes the law of X and N refers to the normal distribution.A Risk measure derivations 87









































i − ˆ µT
 2
,
the maximum likelihood estimators for µ and σ2, respectively.
Since the VaR and ES are functions of µ and σ, their asymptotic distribution
can be computed by applying the delta method (see, for example, Van der Vaart
(1998)) to (4.25). We start with VaR. Let θ =( µ,σ)a n dX0 is the initial capital.






























































19In the interest of readability the dependence on parameters is suppressed in the notation.88 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital











































































































































































































































, τ = nT. The empirical















n(Fn (y) − F (y))
d →N(0,F(y)(1− F (y))) (4.39)
To compute the asymptotic distributions of the VaR and the ES we need to
compute the inﬂuence functions20 of the VaR and the ES. The value-at-risk21 is
given by
ΨVaR (F) ≡ VaRmn (Πmn)
= F
−1 (p), (4.40)




|t=0ψ ((1 − t)F + tδx),
where δx denotes the Dirac measure.
21The quantile function of CDF F is the generalized inverse F−1 :( 0 ,1) → IR given by
F−1 (α)=i n f{x : F (x) ≥ α}90 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital
and its inﬂuence function by
ψVaR (F)=
p − I I[y,∞) (F −1 (p))
f (F −1 (p))
. (4.41)











f2 (F −1 (p))
 
(4.42)
Based on the asymptotic distribution given in (4.42) we can construct a conﬁdence
interval for F −1 (p), namely
CI1−α (VaRmn (Πmn)) =
 
  VaRmn (Πmn) ± zα/2
 
p(1 − p)
nf2 (F −1 (p))
 
, (4.43)
where zα denotes the α-quantile of the standard normal distribution. The density












The worst-case VaR is given by
Ψ
wc
VaR (F)=V a R
wc
mn (Πmn)
=V a R mn (Πmn) − zα/2
 
p(1 − p)
nf2 (F −1 (p))
. (4.45)


















where f  can be estimated by
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VaRmn =I E ψ
wc2
VaR (F).
The expected shortfall is given by
ΨES (F)=E S mn (Πmn)
=I E F
 












I I(−∞,F−1(p)] (y) − ΨES (F)+F
−1 (p). (4.49)
The asymptotic variance of   ESmn (Πmn)=I E Fn (Y | Y ≤ F −1 (p)) is given by










































A conﬁdence interval for ESmn (Πmn)=I E ( Y | Y ≤ F −1 (p)) can be constructed
using (4.50), namely
CI1−α (ESmn (Πmn)) =
 






. (4.51)92 Model Risk and Regulatory Capital











and its inﬂuence function is given by
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The asymptotic distribution of   ES
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This appendix describes the data used in the study. For the S&P 500 series we
use the total return series from Thomson Datastream code: S&PCOMP(RI). The
£/$ exchange rates is given by Thomson Datastream code: USBRITP(ER). For
the US risk free interest rate we have transformed the Thomson Datastream series
ECUSD3M(IR) to continuously compounded interest rates. For the UK risk free
interest rates we use the continuously compounded interest rates of the Thomson
Datastream series ECUKP3M(IR).Chapter 5
How Risky are Written
Derivatives Positions? A Model
Risk Study
5.1 Introduction
During the nineties we saw a spectacular growth of trading derivatives instruments
which continues in the new millennium. For example, the turnover of exchange-
traded ﬁnancial derivatives is estimated at about $ 192 trillion and the notional
amount of outstanding OTC contracts is estimated at $ 128 trillion (see Jeanneau
(2002)). Though the larger part consists of (short-term) interest rate derivatives
which are almost exclusively traded between ﬁnancial institutions, a signiﬁcant part
is due to equity products traded by the public. Taking into account that the option
buyer has liability limited to the option premium, while the option seller risks losses
that can severely exceed his initial premium it comes as no surprise that the public
prefers to be on the buy side. As each contract needs a buyer and a writer, the
ﬁnancial institutions need to be short in options in case the public wants to be long
in options. Being short options ﬁnancial institutions are exposed to several risks.
Derivatives risks can be decomposed into several categories, such as market risk,
credit risk, legal risk, and operational risk. The derivatives community has be-
come increasingly aware of these risks. This contributed to more formal methods of
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derivative risk assessment (see, for example, Basel Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion (1996a)).
Due to the growing complexity of derivatives markets, ﬁnancial institutions rely
more and more on the use of models to assess the risks to which they are exposed.
The accuracy of these risk assessments depends crucially on the extent to which
a market can be reliably modelled. Choosing an appropriate model for risk as-
sessments is an important and diﬃcult task. It is a widespread feeling among both
academics and practitioners that, although some models do a better job than others,
the search for one ultimate model is futile. An approach that takes the limitations
of our knowledge into account is to develop models — depending on the application
(pricing, hedging, ...) — that capture the most important aspects of a particular
market, and to somehow control for the fact that the assessment of risk is based
on a possibly misspeciﬁed model (see, for example, Derman(1996, 2001) for a prac-
titioner’s view). In practice, it has become customary to set aside so-called model
reserves. This means that booking of certain proﬁts on trades is postponed if it is
felt that these proﬁts are sensitive to the model used. The hazard of working with
a potentially misspeciﬁed model is termed model risk.
In the early days of option pricing plain vanilla options were not traded very
frequently and, therefore, their pricing posed a modelling challenge. Currently,
the market for (short-term) plain vanilla options is so liquid that pricing does not
require much modelling. A simple interpolation of the implied volatility surface
would already give a reasonable price. Therefore, the pricing model risk is negligible.
However, modelling remains crucial for hedging. Depending on the hedge strategy
used, the risk proﬁle of a derivative can take (very) diﬀerent forms (see Green and
Figlewski (1999)).1 In this study we focus on the hedging model risk for plain vanilla
options and aim to quantify this.
The main contribution of this chapter is an empirical investigation of the hedging
model risk associated with the industry standard Black-Scholes Greeks in the S&P
500 market and some of the most important currency markets. For this we provide
a framework to chart model risk. We use the model risk framework proposed in
1For exotic options (or illiquid derivatives in general), markets are not as mature as for plain
vanillas. Therefore, in these markets besides hedging model risk also considerable pricing model
risk can exist (see, for example, Hull and Suo (2002) and Hirsa, Courtadon and Madan (2002)).5.1 Introduction 95
Chapter 4 that builds on the axiomatic market/credit risk framework proposed by
Artzner et al. (1999). Furthermore, we provide simulation evidence showing the
hazards of relying on historical simulation to quantify the risk associated with the
writing of options. We propose and use the bootstrap as an alternative.
As pointed out in Green and Figlewski (1999) three important sources of model
risk arise when trading derivatives. First, the model can be misspeciﬁed. In case of
pricing (liquid) plain vanilla options, this is not of major concern, since prices can
be readily found in the market. However, the hedge parameters used are based on
modelling assumptions. Second, the option value is derived based on no-arbitrage
assumptions. This means that the model prescribes a hedge strategy which is usually
speciﬁed in continuous time. This is not be feasible in practice, since this entails an
inﬁnite number of transactions. Therefore, approximate (delta) hedging in discrete
time is used and we focus in this paper on the risk proﬁle of the cost of hedging
in case of a discrete (daily) hedge strategy. A third source of model risk is the
problem of unobserved model parameters such as, for example, volatility (see the
literature on stochastic volatility models such as Hull and White (1987) and Heston
(1993) amongst others). Though the method presented allows more advanced option
pricing models, we restrict our focus to the Black-Scholes model since this remains
the industry standard for hedging plain vanilla options.
To extend the current practice of computing risk assessments on the basis of
some given (“nominal”) model for the cost of hedging, we also determine a set of
plausible alternative models. In recognition of the fact that each of these models is
a (reasonable) candidate for representing reality, we propose to compute a worst-
case market risk measure of the cost of hedging over the set of alternative models.
Model risk is then deﬁned as the diﬀerence between this measure and the market
risk measure computed from the nominal model. Using sets of alternative models
that are or are not restricted to a model class, we distinguish between model risk
due to estimation error and model risk due to misspeciﬁcation.
We investigate the hedging model risk associated with the Black-Scholes delta
hedge for plain vanilla options. The markets that we investigate are the S&P 500,
and the $/£, £/,a n d$ / exchange rates. We ﬁnd that in our sample the mis-
speciﬁcation risk is considerable. Further, we ﬁnd in the S&P 500 market that the96 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study
market sets a premium which could serve as reward for facing the model risk.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section considers
the risks associated with derivatives. Section 5.3 sets out the model risk framework.
Section 5.4 describes the methodology used and provides supporting simulation ev-
idence and empirical analysis. In Section 5.5 the results are presented. Finally,
Section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Derivatives risks
Theoretically, derivative assets can be exactly replicated (in case of a complete
market) by a (dynamic) position in the underlying asset and some numeraire asset.
In practice, these replicating strategies are not feasible due to transaction costs
and the inability to trade continuously. Therefore, ﬁnancial institutions rely on
hedge strategies in discrete time. However, by hedging in discrete time the position
consisting of the derivative and the hedging portfolio is no longer risk free and
subjected to market risk. We use this market risk to get to a deﬁnition of the risk
associated with a derivative.
5.2.1 Cost of Hedging
For a portfolio of basis assets it is natural to determine the market risk (by a risk
measure such a value-at-risk or expected shortfall) on the distribution of the portfolio
at the relevant time horizon, say T. In principle, the same can be done for deriva-
tives using the maturity date as the relevant time horizon T. However, this would
ignore the fact that ﬁnancial institutions have the possibility (and extensively use it)
to hedge their derivatives portfolios. Indeed, Green and Figlewski (1999) found that
derivative risks, as expected, can be reduced considerably by delta hedging. There-
fore, the hedge strategy of the ﬁnancial institution should be taken into account
when calculating the market risk of a derivative. We suggest to deﬁne the market
risk of a derivative as the market risk of the cost of hedging of this derivative. The
cost of hedging C (X;γ) of claim X, say a call option, using trading strategy γ on5.3 Model risk 97






















where S denotes the prices of the underlying asset(s), N denotes the price of a nu-
















The ﬁrst term of (5.1) denotes the discounted payoﬀ at T = tn, the second gives the
discounted gains/losses over time and the ﬁnal term gives the dividend payouts.
The trading strategy γ used does not have to be related to the pricing model. For
example, in the following sections we mostly use market prices (model independent)
and hedge using the Black-Scholes delta hedge with historical (implied) volatilities.
5.3 Model risk
Market risk measures such as value-at-risk and expected shortfall are typically based
on a class of scenarios together with a base probability measure; both items are
provided by a model m. Therefore, the market risk measure can be computed once
the model is selected. However, there is uncertainty about which model to use.
A ﬁnancial institution’s perception of market risk can deviate substantially from
the actual market risk due to the fact that the actual dynamics are insuﬃciently
represented by the model dynamics. Due to the use of an incorrect model, the
ﬁnancial institution may accept risks that it would ﬁnd unacceptable in case it
would know the actual dynamics. The risk associated to the mismatch between
model dynamics and actual dynamics is called model risk.
5.3.1 Notation and deﬁnitions
Since in this paper we are interested in model risk for written derivatives positions,
we are working with classes of models rather than with a single model. It is not
always convenient to use the same probability space for each of these models. There-
fore, we start by a formal description of a setting that allows the use of multiple
2The symbol   denotes the Hadamard product, that is, x   y =( x1y1,...,xnyn) (see, for
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probability spaces (see also Chapter 4).We deﬁne a model as a probability space
(Ω,F,P) with Ω the sample space, F the set of events, and P the probability mea-
sure. This setting could be extended to more elaborate probabilistic settings; in
particular, a ﬁltration might be assumed given.3 For simplicity, we focus on ﬁnal
payoﬀs of the derivatives in this chapter so that the above notion will be suﬃcient
for the purposes of this chapter. For any model m,l e tR(m) denote the space of
equivalence classes of measurable real-valued functions on (Ω,F). If a model m is
given, a risk is deﬁned on m as an element of R(m). This deﬁnition, in which a
“risk” is a random variable deﬁned on a given probability space, follows the termi-
nology of Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen (2000). We introduce a similar concept
for model classes rather than for individual models. M denotes the class of mod-
els. A product can then be deﬁned on M as a mapping that assigns to each model
m ∈Ma risk deﬁned on m. The set of all products deﬁned on M is denoted by
X(M). The risk induced by a product Π on a model m will be denoted by Πm.T h e
product that we use in this paper is the delta-hedged derivative given in (5.1).
We now proceed to risk measures, again starting with the deﬁnition for an indi-
vidual model. A risk measure deﬁned on m is a map from R(m)t oI R∪{∞}.4 The
notion of a risk measure can be generalized to a class of models using so-called risk
measurement methods. A risk measurement method deﬁned on a class of models
M is a mapping that assigns to each model m ∈Ma risk measure deﬁned on
m. Suppose that the ﬁnancial institution uses a risk measurement method RMM
to assess the acceptability of a product (portfolio) Π. In model m, the risk of the
product Π is computed as RMMm(Πm). To take into account model uncertainty, we
take a set of alternative dynamics K around m and compute the worst-case market
risk measure (with respect to K), which is given by supk∈K RMMk(Πk). Model risk
may now be quantiﬁed as follows.
3In case of (5.1) we should introduce a ﬁltration for a formal deﬁnition such that the underlying
process and the trading strategy are well deﬁned w.r.t. this ﬁltration. However, since we are only
interested in (discounted) ﬁnal payoﬀs of the derivative we do not need to go beyond the static
model. If we would also be interested in payoﬀs during the life of the option, we would need
to extend the framework by using stochastic processes instead of random variables (see Artzner,
Delbaen, Eber, Heath and Ku (2002)).
4Including ∞ allows risks to be deﬁned on more general probability spaces, see Delbaen (2000).5.3 Model risk 99
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Model risk measure)5 Let M be a class of models, let m be a model
in M,a n dl e tK be a subset of M containing m. Furthermore, let Π be a product
deﬁned on M and let RMM be a risk measurement method for M.T h emodel risk
associated to the method RMM of product Π, with respect to the nominal model m
and the tolerance set K,i sg i v e nb y
φRMM(Π,m,K) = supk∈K RMMk(Πk) − RMMm(Πm). (5.2)
The model risk measure that we have deﬁned may have some desirable prop-
erties depending on the market risk measurement method from which it has been
derived. In Chapter 4 invariance and positive homogeneity are proved. In gen-
eral, the model risk measure does not satisfy subadditivity and convexity, but this
presents no problems (see Chapter 4 for a discussion).
5.3.2 Decomposition of Model Risk
In the previous section we did not specify a model m or a set of alternative mod-
els K. In this section we discuss some possible choices for the set of alternative
dynamics K. In practice, one starts with a (usually parametric) model class, say
M(Θ) ≡{ (Ω,F,Pθ):θ ∈ Θ}⊂M . Using an estimation or calibration procedure,
a particular element m(ˆ θ) is chosen from M(Θ). Even if the actual dynamics, say
m0, belong to the parametric model class M(Θ), that is m0 = m(θ0) for some
θ0 ∈ Θ, the ﬁnancial institution faces the risk of selecting the wrong element m(ˆ θ).
This risk is called model risk due to estimation error.T od e ﬁ n ean e i g h b o r h o o do f
plausible models around m(ˆ θ), one typically uses conﬁdence regions. Depending on
a chosen level α we take a (1 − α)% conﬁdence region around ˆ θ. A general case
is treated in Chapter 4, but here we limit our focus. Since we are interested in a
speciﬁc market risk measurement method RMM and a speciﬁc product Π, we use a
5The case where RMMm(Πm)=∞ is uninteresting since the ﬁnancial institution will never
accept the product Π in its portfolio.100 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study
conﬁdence interval around the risk measurement method K deﬁned by6
K(α)=
 









   
.
(5.3)
We deﬁne model risk due to estimation error,o rs i m p l yestimation risk, as the model
risk that is obtained from a tolerance set derived from conﬁdence regions within the
model class.
Now let us consider the situation where the actual dynamics may not belong to
M(Θ). As above, we can deﬁne tolerance sets that are speciﬁcally tied to a given
risk measurement method and a given product. Along this line, one may estimate
RMMm (Πm) ﬁrst and deﬁne a tolerance set based on a conﬁdence region CI1−α for
the estimate
K(α)={m :R M M m (Πm) ∈ CI1−α}. (5.4)
In general, we can determine tolerance sets that are restricted or are not restricted
to a model class (unrestricted, in the sequel). As above, one may deﬁne model risk
due to estimation error as the model risk restricted to the model class M(Θ).
The amount that has to be added to arrive at the model risk determined from the
unrestricted method may be termed model risk due to misspeciﬁcation or simply
misspeciﬁcation risk. In other words, if Kr is the restricted tolerance set and Ku is
the unrestricted one, then we deﬁne the misspeciﬁcation risk for a given product Π
as
φRMM (Π,Kr, Ku) = supk∈Ku RMMk (Πk) − supk∈Kr RMMk (Πk). (5.5)
However, the quantity deﬁned above may in some cases be less than zero, whereas
we would prefer to deﬁne misspeciﬁcation risk in such a way that it is always non-
negative. To achieve this with the above deﬁnition, we have to make sure that the
set Kr is nested in Ku. W ed ot h i sb yu s i n gaf a m i l y{Ku(α)} of tolerance sets
parameterized by conﬁdence level α. For a given conﬁdence level α and a given















level, we then take Ku = Ku(β)w h e r eβ is deﬁned by
β =m i n ( α,sup{γ ∈ (0,1) : Kr ∈K u (γ)}). (5.6)
Chapter 4 provides some alternatives for nesting Kr in Ku.
5.4 Methodology
5.4.1 Set-up of experiment
We investigate several major markets on which ﬁnancial options are actively traded:
The Standard and Poor’s 500 (SPX) for equity options, the U.S. dollar / British
pound ($/£), British pound / Japanese yen (£/), and the U.S. dollar / Japanese
yen ($/) foreign exchange (FX) options. Sample periods vary depending on data
availability. The data were obtained from Thomson Datastream and ABN-AMRO
Bank (deﬁnitions and sources of the data can be found in Appendix B). The models
that we investigate all come from the Black-Scholes (BS) framework. More advanced
option pricing models have been used in the literature (see, for example, Carr,
Geman, Madan and Yor (2002)), but these are mainly used for calibration to plain
vanilla instruments and pricing of exotics. For hedging of plain vanillas options the
Black-Scholes type models remain the most widely used derivatives models.
The original BS model (see Black and Scholes (1973)) was designed for European
options on non-dividend paying stock. Since the SPX consists of dividend paying
stocks, we use the adjusted BS model of Merton (1973) which allows for a continuous
proportional dividend yield δ. Since future dividends are unknown, this represents
another source of risk in trading derivatives, namely dividend risk. We neglect this
type of risk and compute the option prices using the realized dividend yield. Since
dividends are usually quite stable over time this seems to be of minor inﬂuence.
For FX options we use the Garman-Kohlhagen model which adjusts the original BS
model for options on foreign currencies. For the pricing formulas we refer to the
original papers (see Garman and Kohlhagen (1983) and the citations above or a
standard textbook such as Hull (2002)).
To compare risks of derivatives with diﬀerent characteristics (call/put ﬂag, mon-102 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study
eyness, and time to maturity) we always write enough contracts to generate a pre-
mium (initial value) of $100. For example, if an option is valued at $5, we write 20
contracts. The results can then be interpreted as a dollar return on an investment
of $100 in the speciﬁed contract or percentage returns per dollar of option premium.
To limit derivatives risk one can essentially distinguish three strategies. The ﬁrst
strategy is to diversify using derivatives with diﬀerent characteristics and other risky
assets. The second approach is using cash ﬂow matching which consists of creating
oﬀsetting positions with diﬀerent counterparties such that the derivatives contract
is replicated. Though cash ﬂow matching is the most precise method of hedging
and, furthermore, model independent, it is rarely possible for a ﬁnancial institution
to construct a cash ﬂow matching hedge. In general, the public wants to be long in
options which brings about the short options position of the ﬁnancial industry and,
thereby, making it impossible for the ﬁnancial institution to match all of its cash
ﬂows. Finally, the ﬁnancial institution can hedge using delta hedging to hedge the
derivatives risk.7 Since cash ﬂow matching is impractical and Green and Figlewski
(1999) showed that delta hedging is far superior to hedging by diversiﬁcation, we
restrict ourselves to delta hedging which is also the most often used hedge strategy
in the ﬁnancial industry.
Since option traders are usually restricted in taking directional bets on the mar-
ket, we investigate straddles instead of individual calls and puts. ITM options end
in the money much more than OTM options. This could result in diﬀerences in the
eﬀectiveness of the hedge strategy. To investigate the inﬂuence of moneyness we
compare the results for ITM, ATM, and OTM options where we take OTM options
with a moneyness of 5% out of the money and ITM options with a moneyness of
5% in the money.8 For a straddle it is not clear what OTM or ITM is, since when
the call is ITM the put is OTM and vice versa. In our terminology the moneyness
of the call gives the moneyness of straddle.
7Traders also often hedge other greeks (gamma, vega, etc.). As argued by Green and Figlewski
(1999) this requires, however, other options which need to be bought from other ﬁnancial institu-
tions. The overall ﬁnancial industry is therefore restricted to delta hedging.
8Moneyness is deﬁned as m = log(F/κ) for calls and as m = log(κ/F) for puts, where F denotes
the futures price, e.g. F = SerT with T the time to maturity and r the riskless interest rate.5.4 Methodology 103
5.4.2 Estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk
In order to decompose the model risk into estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk
we need to determine the sets (5.3) and (5.4).
Let G denote the distribution function of the cost of hedging. This distribution
depends on the distribution of the underlying, F, and the hedging strategy, γ, but
for notational convenience we suppress the dependence on the hedging strategy and
write G = G(F). In case we can parameterize F, we write Fθ and ˆ F denotes Fˆ θ.
We can use the standard expansion to take estimation risk into account (see, for
example, Van der Vaart (1998))
√








where φρ◦G(ht)=φG(F)◦ψF(ht) (see Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Lemma 3.9.3)
denotes the composite inﬂuence function of observation t, φG(F) denotes the inﬂuence
function of the risk measure, ψF(ht) the inﬂuence function of the underlying, and
ˆ F = FT, the empirical distribution function, if F cannot be parameterized.
Unfortunately, G is not known analytically. However, it can be retrieved by
simulation. Let  k(G( ˆ F)) denote the estimator for  (G( ˆ F)) using k simulations.
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(5.8)
for all risk measures   considered in this paper. Thus, by taking k large enough
 (G( ˆ F)) can be approximated as closely as desired.
Though we cannot analytically compute the asymptotic variance of (5.7), we can
determine it by applying the bootstrap. We use the fact that
√
T( (G( ˆ F))− (G(F))
has the same asymptotic variance as
√
T( (G( ˆ F ∗))− (G( ˆ F)), where F ∗ denotes the
bootstrap empirical distribution (see Van der Vaart and Wellner (1996) Theorem
3.9.11).9,10
9Let FT denote the empirical measure of an i.i.d. sample X1,...,XT from a distribution F.
Given the sample values, let X∗
1,...,X∗
T be a i.i.d. sample from FT. The bootstrap empirical
distribution is then given by 1/T
 T
t=1 δX∗
t , where δX∗
t denotes the Dirac measure in X∗
t .
10Due to the simulation error, we actually compute
√
T( k(G( ˆ F∗)) −  k(G( ˆ F))). However,
by using the same random seed for all bootstrap samples, the inﬂuence of simulation error is104 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study















The period {t−n+1,...,t} is termed the estimation period. We compute for these es-
timation periods  k(G( ˆ F)) for k =5 ,000 as estimator for  (G( ˆ F)). For the determi-













.11 Computing  (G( ˆ F ∗,b)) for b =1 ,...,B we can es-
timate the asymptotic variance of (5.7) with the sample variance of
 
 (G( ˆ F ∗,b))
 B
b=1
and construct conﬁdence intervals for  (G( ˆ F)). In the restricted case, F = Fθ,t h i s
conﬁdence interval gives the set (5.3) and for the unrestricted case it gives the set
(5.4).
5.4.3 Hedging: historical versus implied volatility
For pricing of liquid derivatives, implied volatility is by deﬁnition superior to his-
torical volatility, since by deﬁnition implied volatilities recover the market prices.
Although in practice usually implied volatilities are used for hedging as well, it is
by no means obvious that using implied volatilities for hedging outperforms using
historical volatilities. The usual argument in favor of using implied volatilities is
that the implied volatility should be a better predictor for future volatility than
historical volatility. However, the evidence for this statement is rather scant (see,
for example, Canina and Figlewski (1993)). Furthermore, implied volatilities are
subject to severe measurement errors (see, for example, Christensen and Prabhala
(1998)). This comes as no surprise, if one considers the fact that implied volatility
can be seen as the garbage bin of the Black-Scholes formula and therefore captures
all misspeciﬁcations of the model. On the other hand, historical volatility has also
not proven to be a very reliable estimator of future volatility, but has the advantage
that it is equal for all the derivatives on the same underlying. In order to investigate
the hedging performance of historical and implied volatilities we compute one-day
relative hedge errors using both the implied and historical volatility estimators for
suppressed.
11The bootstrap draws time points from the estimation period and uses both the return of the
underlying and the numeraire at these time points.5.4 Methodology 105
the $/,$ /£,a n d£/ exchange rates.12
We ﬁnd that in most cases using implied volatilities lead to slightly better hedg-
ing performance measured in terms of mean, variance, 1% VaR, and 2.5% ES. This
performance is often statistically signiﬁcant, but comparing the performance mea-
sures one may conclude that the economic signiﬁcance is small. Since using historical
volatilities leads to (slightly) worse values for value-at-risk and expected shortfall
this implies that the misspeciﬁcation risk is somewhat overestimated in our analysis.
5.4.4 Historical simulation versus bootstrap
In order to determine an estimate of the empirical distribution of the cost of hedging,
we have two alternatives. First, we can rely on historical simulation, following,
among others, Galai (1977), Merton, Scholes and Gladstein(1978, 1982), and Green
and Figlewski (1999). In case of historical simulation the amount of data available
for estimation is rather limited unless one uses overlapping samples as is common in
the literature. Though historical simulation produces consistent estimates in case
of overlapping samples, standard errors are hard to estimate in ﬁnite samples.
To perform the historical simulation we need data of the underlying {s0,...,sn}
and from this we can get the (daily) log returns {h1,...,hn}. We start by writing
an option f at time t = 0 and continue this until t = n − k,w h e r ek = T ∗
no,a n dT denotes the maturity of the option in years and no is the number of
days in a year. In addition to the option prices {f(0),...,f(n − k)} we compute
the actual cost of hedging the option, using the speciﬁed hedge strategy, to get
{C(0),...,C(n − k)} (see eq. (5.1)). Using this data we compute an estimator for
the risk proﬁle (cumulative distribution function) of the (discounted) ﬁnal proﬁt
and loss (P&L) account P&L ≡ f − C. The risk proﬁle of the P&L can be seen
as the return distribution of pricing derivatives with the speciﬁed pricing model (in
our case the BS model with historical or implied volatility) and the speciﬁed hedge
strategy (daily hedge based on BS deltas using historical volatility). For this risk
proﬁle we can then compute the value-at-risk and expected shortfall. In doing so we
need to take into account the fact that the set f(0) − C(0),...,f(n − k) − C(n − k)
12The one period relative hedge error is deﬁned as
f(t+1)−γ(t)S(t+1)
f(t)−γ(t)S(t) − 1. Using relative hedge



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is subject to the overlapping samples problem. We handle this problem by using
the method of Newey and West (1987).
We have performed a simulation study to investigate the performance of conﬁ-
dence intervals resulting from the historical simulation method using both the stan-
dard conﬁdence intervals as those computed using Newey-West standard errors. We
simulated K =5 ,000 daily return time series of 20 years following the Black-Scholes
world assumptions with mean and variance estimated on daily returns data on the
S&P500 from October 26, 1981 to April 26, 2003. For each of these time series we
estimated the mean, 1% VaR, and 2.5% ES for a 3 months ATM call option and
their asymptotic normal distributions. We compared these with the “true” mean,
1% VaR, and 2.5% ES of the distribution of the cost of hedging of a 3 months ATM
call option computed based on 100,000 cross-sectional simulations.13 We compared
these “true” values to the asymptotic distribution by computing for each time series
to which the quantile the realization corresponds. In case the asymptotic distribu-
tion is correct this should result in a uniform distribution. In Figure 5.1 we see that
this is far from the case. In case we correct for the overlapping samples problem
using the Newey-West (see Newey and West (1987)) asymptotic distribution the
situation is much better than using the standard asymptotic distribution, but still
far from good.14 Only in 70% (22%), 70% (43%), and 74% (38%) of the ideally
95% of the cases the true mean, 1% VaR, and 2.5% ES, respectively are within the
computed Newey-West (usual) conﬁdence intervals.15
A second approach is to use the bootstrap (see Efron (1979) for the original
work and Horowitz (1999) for an overview). A problem arising with the bootstrap
methodology is that it is more problematic to use implied volatility for hedging,
because for bootstrap time series of the underlying no implied volatilities are avail-
able.16 However, in Section 5.4.4, we saw that, although for hedging purposes his-
13The standard errors on the risk measures based on 100,000 simulations are so small that these
can be taken as the “true” values.
14In their analysis Green and Figlewski (1999) do not correct for the overlapping samples problem
and therefore their standard errors are an underestimation of the true standard errors.
15We did the same analysis for diﬀerent option characteristics such as time to maturity, money-
ness and option type, but the conclusions remain the same. We also varied the number of lags to
be used in the Newey-West procedure, but this only led to minor changes in the results.
16One can, of course, use a simultaneous bootstrap of the returns and the implied volatilities, but
this requires assumptions on the dependence between the implied volatilities and the underlying108 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study



















Figure 5.1: Performance historical simulation
This ﬁgure shows the distribution of the quantiles of the asymptotic distributions
(both standard and Newey-West (with the number of lags equal to the overlapping
period)) of the mean, 1% VaR, and 2.5% ES corresponding to the “true” mean,
1% VaR, and 2.5% ES. The derivative used in this analysis is a 3 month ATM call
option on the S&P 500.5.4 Methodology 109
Table 5.2: Test results bootstrap
In this table we present the standard errors for market risk estimates. The column of
simulation gives the results based on monte-carlo simulation. The column bootstrap
mr gives the results for the bootstrap using MC simulation in order to estimate the
risk measures. Finally, the column bootstrap ms gives the results for the bootstrap
using drawing with replacement to estimate the risk measures.
















torical volatility estimators slightly underperform implied volatility, the diﬀerences
are small. Therefore, the misspeciﬁcation risk is only slightly overestimated. We
have also performed a simulation experiment to check the accuracy of the bootstrap
methodology. We have simulated 1,000 times a 3 years history according to the
Black-Scholes world assumptions again using the mean and variance estimated on
the S&P 500 data from October 26, 1981 to April 26, 2003. For each simulated
history, we compute 1% value-at-risk and 2.5% expected shortfall using K =5 ,000
simulations. This allows us to compute conﬁdence intervals for the risk measures.
For one of the simulated histories, we use the bootstrap to generate 199 bootstrap
samples. For each of the bootstrap samples the risk measures are determined using
1) simulation from the normal distribution with mean and variance equal to those
of the data in order to get the market risk, 2) drawing with replacement from the
data in order to get the misspeciﬁcation risk (which equals zero in this experiment).
In Table 5.2 we see that the variance estimated using the bootstrap for market risk
is very similar to that of the “true” variance computed using simulation. Further-
more, we see that the variance estimated using bootstrap for misspeciﬁcation risk
is somewhat higher, but not drastically so. Therefore, we may conclude that the
bootstrap gives reliable estimators for the variance of our estimates of market risk.
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5.5 Results
We have conducted an empirical analysis of the one-month and three-month S&P
500 5% ITM, ATM, and 5% OTM straddles. Furthermore, we conducted an em-
pirical analysis of the one-month and three-months ATM straddles for the $/£,
$/, £/ FX markets. For the FX straddles contracts with maturities equal to
one-month and three-months were readily available. For the S&P 500 straddles ma-
turity dates are ﬁxed and therefore option time to maturities vary in our data. We
have selected the straddles closest to the desired characteristics (time to maturity
and moneyness) and used linear interpolation of the volatility term structure to get
the volatilities for the one and three month straddles. In order to get estimates for
the market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk, we used historical volatilities to
price and hedge the options. We also conducted the analysis using market prices
(still hedging using historical volatilities) to investigate whether the markets want
to be compensated for bearing the misspeciﬁcation risk.
Figure 5.2 presents the historical and ATM implied volatilities for the markets
investigated. We see that in most markets the implied volatilities are on average
somewhat higher than the historical ones, but in the FX markets periods of higher
implied than historical and lower implied than historical volatilities alternate. In
case of the S&P 500 we clearly see that the implied volatilities exceed the histori-
cal volatilities and, furthermore, that this diﬀerence increases under more volatile
conditions.
In Figure 5.3 we present the results for the market risk, estimation risk, and
misspeciﬁcation risk based on the 1% value-at-risk measure for the 3 month ITM
straddles on the S&P 500 market. We employed a three year rolling window estima-
tion period to estimate the historical volatility. The frequency of the results in two
months (other values are interpolated). We ﬁnd that the estimation risk is rather
consistently around 4, while the misspeciﬁcation risk (on top of the estimation risk)
varies between 4 and 30. In percentage terms we ﬁnd that about 50 to 60% of the
total risk can be explained by the market risk estimate. Between 5 and 10% is
due to estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation risk ranges from 20% to around 40% in
some periods. In the lower panel of Figure 5.3 we present the results where option
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Figure 5.2: Comparison historical vs ATM implied volatilities
In this ﬁgure we plotted the three-year rolling window historical volatilities against
the one-month ATM implied volatilities for the £/$, £/,a n dt h e$ / exchange
rate. In case of the S&P 500 the 3 month ATM implied volatilities are used. Data is
from 02-01-92−29-08-97 for the S&P 500 and from 09-08-1995−01-04-2003 for the
$/£, £/,a n dt h e$ / exchange rates.
after 1994 the gap between historical and implied volatilities is so large that the
misspeciﬁcation risk is reduced to zero.
Figure 5.4 presents the results for the market risk, estimation risk, and misspec-
iﬁcation risk based on the 2.5% expected shortfall measure for the 1 month ATM
straddles on the £/ market. We ﬁnd that the estimation risk is rather consistently
around 8.5 (see Table 5.4), while the misspeciﬁcation risk (on top of the estimation
risk) varies between 30 to over 100. The large values for misspeciﬁcation risk are
mainly due to the highly volatile markets in 1999 around the LTCM crisis. Since
we use a three year rolling window this has an aftereﬀect on the estimates of mis-
speciﬁcation risk. Ignoring the “tub” after 1999, market risk accounts for about 50
to 60% of the total risk. Around 5% is due to estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation
risk ranges around 40%. In the lower panels of Figure 5.4 we give the results where
option values are calculated using market values. We see that under “normal” mar-112 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study























Figure 5.3: Model Risk VaR S&P 500
This ﬁgure presents the market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk based on the
1% value-at-risk measure for 3 month ITM straddles in the S&P 500 market. The
upper panel gives the 1% value-at-risk for a position of $100 with straddles sold
at Black-Scholes prices using historical volatilities. The middle panel gives the
percentages due to market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk. The lower panel
again presents the 1% value-at-risk for a position of $100, but the straddles sold at
market prices.
ket conditions (that is, excluding the tub) misspeciﬁcation risk is reduced, while in
the tub misspeciﬁcation risk is higher.
Table 5.3 presents the results of the market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation
risk for the S&P 500 market. We see that the market risk and misspeciﬁcation
risk is far larger for the ATM straddles than for the ITM and OTM straddles for
both maturities. This can be explained by the fact that ATM straddles have a
higher gamma position than ITM and OTM straddles, which makes delta hedging
more variable. As can be expected, we ﬁnd that all market risks estimates are
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
that estimation risk is fairly large for most cases and highly statistically signiﬁcant.
Misspeciﬁcation estimates for the one-month straddles are economically signiﬁcant,5.5 Results 113
Table 5.3: Results S&P 500 market
In this table we present the results for the 1 and 3 month S&P 500 straddles based
on 1% value-at-risk and 2.5% expected shortfall. We present averages of the market
risk, estimation risk, and misspeciﬁcation risk (standard errors in brackets). The
column, TR IV, gives the total risk (that is, cumulative market, estimation, and
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Figure 5.4: Model Risk ES £/ FX rate
This ﬁgure presents the market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk based on the
2.5% expected shortfall measure for 1 month ATM straddles in the £/ market.
The upper panel gives the 2.5% value-at-risk for a position of $100 with straddles
sold at Black-Scholes prices using historical volatilities. The middle panel gives the
percentages due to market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk. The lower panel
presents the 2.5% expected shortfall for a position of $100, but the straddles sold at
market prices.
but statistically not signiﬁcant. For the three-months straddles, we ﬁnd that the
misspeciﬁcation risks estimates are also high (though below those for the one month),
and statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the average estimates for total risk (that
is, market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk) is below the market risk estimate
using prices based on historical volatilities in case of the 3 months straddles, if we
compare the hedging cost of the derivative to the market price. The market seems
to demand a risk premium for running misspeciﬁcation risk.
Table 5.4 presents the results for the FX markets. Again we ﬁnd that market
risk and estimation risk are economically and statistically signiﬁcant for all markets.
Comparing the results to the ATM straddles in the S&P 500 market, we ﬁnd that
market and estimation risk estimates are about the same. Misspeciﬁcation risk5.5 Results 115
Table 5.4: Results FX markets
In this table we present the results for the 1 and 3 month ATM straddles for the
$/£,$ /,a n d£/ markets based on 1% value-at-risk and 2.5% expected short-
fall. We present averages of the market risk, estimation risk, and misspeciﬁcation
risk (standard errors in brackets). The column, TR IV, gives the total risk (that
is, cumulative market, estimation, and misspeciﬁcation risk) if the market prices
were used. Furthermore, the maximum and minimum misspeciﬁcation risk is given.























































































































(34.2) 71.71 3 .3116 How Risky are Written Derivatives Positions? A Model Risk Study
estimates are much higher, but also have higher standard errors. We ﬁnd that for
both markets the misspeciﬁcation risk is statistically signiﬁcant. An interesting
diﬀerence with the S&P market is that the total risk based on market prices is much
higher than for the S&P 500 market. Furthermore, contrary to the results for the
S&P 500 market almost all total risk estimates are statistically diﬀerent from zero.
It appears that in the FX markets hardly any risk premium is demanded for the
misspeciﬁcation risk.
5.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have empirically investigated the model risk associated with writing
plain vanilla straddles in the S&P 500 equity derivatives market and the $/£, £/,
and the $/ FX derivatives markets.
We apply the bootstrap method to take estimation risk and misspeciﬁcation
risk into account when estimating market risk of written derivative positions. To
support this method in favor of the more often used method of historical simulation
we have provided simulation evidence that historical simulation does a poor job
in estimating estimation risk in samples with sample sizes realistic for ﬁnancial
applications. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that hedging using historical volatilities does
not economically signiﬁcantly underperform hedging using implied volatilities.
We ﬁnd in our samples that for the S&P 500 market considerable estimation
and misspeciﬁcation risk is present. Estimation risk is found to be signiﬁcant for
all products, while misspeciﬁcation risk is signiﬁcant for all three months options.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the market demands a risk premium for bearing the
misspeciﬁcation risk and this premium increases towards the end of our sample. For
the FX markets we also ﬁnd substantial misspeciﬁcation risk, which is found to be
statistically signiﬁcant for the $/ and £/ markets. Interestingly, in our sample
there does not appear to be a risk premium for bearing the misspeciﬁcation risk.A Data 117
A Data
We have available option data on the S&P 500 ranging from January 2, 1992 till Au-
gust 29, 1997. Quotes on the straddles are the end-of-day quotes with synchronous
observations of the underlying index. For the rolling volatility estimators before
January 2, 1992 we use the (total) return index of the S&P 500 from Thomson
Datastream. For the exchange rates we have ATM volatilities, exchange rates, in-
terbank rates matching the option maturities, for the $/£,$ / ,a n dt h e£/.T h e
data runs from 09 − 08 − 1995 to 01 − 04 − 2003.17
17All option data were kindly shared by ABN-AMRO Bank.Part II
Pricing interest rate derivatives
119Chapter 6
Observational Equivalence of
Discrete String Models and
Market Models
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the discrete string model as used by Longstaﬀ, Santa-
Clara and Schwartz (2001a) and Longstaﬀ, Santa-Clara and Schwartz (2001b) (LSS
papers) and its relation to familiar models, namely, the LIBOR market model
(LMM) as introduced by Miltersen, Sandmann and Sondermann (1997), Brace,
Gatarek and Musiela (1997), and Jamshidian (1997) and the HJM framework (see
Heath, Jarrow and Morton (1992)). We show that the discrete version of the string
model for LIBOR rates is observationally equivalent to the LMM and thereby a spe-
cial case of the HJM framework. Since there has been some mysticism surrounding
string models and, in particular, the estimation/calibration of the correlation matrix
we provide some guidelines and references for estimation/calibration.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 6.2, the discrete version
of the string model as used in the LSS papers and the LMM are described. Section
6.3 shows the observational equivalence of the two models and relates them to the
HJM framework. Furthermore, the parsimony of the models is determined. For
illustrative purposes an example of the estimation/calibration of the models and a
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numerical example are provided in Section 6.4. Section 6.5 concludes.
6.2 Description of the models
First, the discrete version of the string model as used in the LSS papers is
described. Second, a description of the LIBOR market model is given.
6.2.1 Discrete string model
Kennedy (1994) introduced the idea to model the evolution of the term structure
of forward rates as a stochastic string. His analysis has been generalized in Kennedy
(1997), Goldstein (2000), and Santa-Clara and Sornette (2001). By construction,
the string model is high-dimensional (inﬁnite dimensional if we model a continuum
of forward rates), since each rate has its own perturbation. Here, we describe the
string model based on a ﬁnite number of forward LIBOR rates. First, we deﬁne a
ﬁnite set of dates, the so-called tenor structure
T0 <T 1 <T 2 <...<T N+1. (6.1)
We indicate the current time by T0 and T1,...,TN+1 denote the forward tenor dates.
This gives a spot LIBOR rate (for [T0,T]) and N forward LIBOR rates from (for
[Ti,T i+1], i =1 ,...,N ). We deﬁne δi = δ (Ti,T i+1) as the so-called daycount fractions
(for an extensive treatment on day-count fractions, see Miron and Swannell (1992)),
which are determined by the maturity of the LIBOR rate and are most often equal
to approximately 3 or 6 months. Let the forward LIBOR rate from Ti to Ti+1 at
time T0 be denoted by F (T0,T i,T i+1) which is deﬁned as








where D(T0,T) denotes the value of a discount bond at time T0 with maturity T.
For notational convenience, we deﬁne Fi (T0) ≡ F (T0,T i,T i+1). The string model6.2 Description of the models 123
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(t)=ρijdt, i,j =1 ,...,N.
If Qi+1 denotes the probability measure (equivalent to M) associated with the nu-
meraire D(•,T i+1) 1 we know from the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing
(see Delbaen and Schachermayer (1994)) that in order to exclude arbitrage possi-
bilities α
Qi+1
i (t) equals 0. Due to market completeness and absence of arbitrage
possibilities the drift term αM
i (t) is uniquely determined for the equivalent proba-
bility measure M used in (6.3). The volatility functions {σi}
N
i=1 and the correlation
parameters {ρij}
N
i,j=1 do not change under a change of measure and are taken to
be constant for ease of exposition, but can easily be extended to be deterministic
functions of time.




















The volatility functions {σi}
N
i=1 together with the correlations of the Wiener
processes determine the covariance matrix of the forward rate changes. In case Ψ
is of full rank, we have to estimate N (N +1 )/2 parameters (N volatility functions
σi and N (N − 1)/2 correlation parameters ρij (ρij = ρji)). For Ψ of rank K<N ,
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6.2.2 LIBOR market model
The LMM as introduced by Miltersen et al. (1997), Brace et al. (1997), and Jamshid-








M (t),i =1 ,...,N, (6.7)
where W M denotes an K-dimensional standard Wiener process (K ≤ N) under
probability measure M, W M =
 
W M
1 ··· W M
K
  
and Γi is a constant K-dimensional




. Just as the volatility functions {σi}
N
i=1
in the discrete string model, the volatility functions Γi can easily be extended to
be deterministic functions of time. In some papers the LMM is speciﬁed with a
correlated Wiener process W ∗M, but by suitable rotation of Γi and W ∗M we can
always rewrite it in the form of (6.7) (see Section 6.4.1).
As in the discrete string model the drift term µM
i (t) is uniquely determined by
the probability measure M used in (6.7) due to market completeness and absence
of arbitrage possibilities. Again the ﬁrst fundamental theorem of asset pricing gives
that in order to exclude arbitrage possibilities µ
Qi+1
i (t) equals 0. Putting the LMM6.3 Observational equivalence 125








































M (t)dt +Γ dW
M (t). (6.8)
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where  ·  denotes the Euclidean norm, Γ is of dimension N×K,a n dt h eN volatility
functions {Γi}
N
i=1 are of dimension 1 × K.
6.3 Observational equivalence
In this section we show that the discrete string model and the LMM are observation-
ally equivalent. By observational equivalence we mean that for every speciﬁcation in
the class of discrete string models one can ﬁnd a speciﬁcation in the class of market
models with the same probabilistic properties and vice versa. By Girsanov’s the-
orem we know that the volatility and correlation structure determines the change





i (t) = 0 and therefore the drift terms in both models are equal
under each equivalent measure M iﬀ the volatility and correlation structure is the
same. Thus, given a discrete string model speciﬁcation σ =( σ1,...,σN) and Ψ, we
need to show that {Γi}
N




i (t) for every i,w h e r e
d =
denotes ‘equal in distribution’. Given a LMM speciﬁcation {Γi}
N
i=1 we need to ﬁnd




iW M (t) for every i.
The ﬁrst part of showing the observational equivalence consists of ﬁnding a spec-
iﬁcation for the LMM in case the discrete string model is given with σ and Ψ(K),
where superscript (K) denotes the rank of Ψ.126 Obs. Equivalence of Discrete String Models and Market Models
The spectral decomposition of Ψ(K) in (6.4) is given by Ψ(K) = UΛU ,w h e r eU
is a matrix of orthonormal eigenvectors and Λ an ordered diagonal matrix with the










where ui denotes the orthonormal eigenvector corresponding to eigenvalue λi.I n





















gives Σ(K) =Γ Γ  . Therefore,
Z (t)












d =Γ W (t). (6.13)
Alternatively, we could have computed Σ(K) =d i a g( σ)Ψ (K)diag(σ), where diag(σ)
denotes a diagonal matrix with size of σ and its elements on the diagonal. Decom-








,w h e r e( ηi,v i) denotes
the ith (eigenvalue, eigenvector) pair of Σ(K).N o t et h a tΓ ∗ has orthogonal columns
and is in general not equal to Γ, but of course Γ∗Γ∗  =Γ Γ   =Σ (K).
The second part consists of ﬁnding a speciﬁcation of the discrete string model
when a LMM with Γ is given. We have Σ(K) =Γ Γ  .S i n c e Σ (K) is as in (6.9), we
2Without loss of generality, we can take (λi,u i) to denote the ith largest (eigenvalue, eigenvector)
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as the discrete string model speciﬁcation.
The discrete string model is therefore always just a convenient way to model
term structure dynamics when the correlation structure is an input to the model.
6.3.1 Relation with HJM framework
The continuous tenor string model described in Santa-Clara and Sornette (2001)
extends the HJM framework (see Heath et al. (1992)). However, in practice one is
limited to using discrete string models and it is therefore interesting from a practical
point of view to know whether discrete string models belong to the HJM framework.
If one speciﬁes a discrete string model for the instantaneous forward rates one can
show analogously to the procedure described in Section 6.3 that it is observationally
equivalent to the HJM model. It is somewhat harder to show that the discrete string
model for forward LIBOR rates ﬁts into the HJM framework. The discrete string
model for forward LIBOR is deﬁned only on a discrete tenor structure.
In order to ﬁnd a HJM speciﬁcation that results in the same behavior for the
forward LIBOR rates as the discrete string model, we need to use a continuous tenor
HJM speciﬁcation. The resulting HJM speciﬁcation is derived in Miltersen et al.
(1997) for the LMM.
By the observational equivalence of the discrete string model for forward LIBOR
rates and the LMM established above, we know that this HJM speciﬁcation also
applies to the discrete string model for forward LIBOR rates.
6.3.2 Parsimony of the models
From casual observation one might be inclined to think that a K-factor LI-
BOR market models needs NK parameters, while the discrete string model only
needs K (K +1 )/2 parameters (see LSS papers). Note, however, that as a con-128 Obs. Equivalence of Discrete String Models and Market Models
sequence of the observational equivalence of the two models, it necessarily follows
that they must need the same number of identifying parameters. Below we demon-
strate that in fact both models can be identiﬁed by NK−K (K − 1)/2 parameters.
As a simple example demonstrating that a discrete string model needs more than
K (K +1 )/2 parameters, note that the K = 1 dimensional discrete string model
requires N (>K(K +1 )/2 = 1) parameters to specify the volatility functions. Fur-
ther, we demonstrate below that there are some ”hidden” restrictions that reduce
the number of free parameters in the LMM from NK to NK− K (K − 1)/2.
We can represent the covariance matrix Σ(K) in its spectral decomposition3
Σ
(K) = VDV







where V is a matrix with orthonormal eigenvectors and D is an ordered diagonal
matrix with the eigenvalues of Σ(K) with ηK+1 = ... = ηN = 0. At ﬁrst it seems
that NK parameters are necessary. However Γ is not unique. Consider a K × K
orthonormal matrix T. Then using Γ∗ = AT and W ∗ = T  W gives the same
dynamics as using Γ and W, where W ∗ is also a standard Wiener process, since
T  W (t)
d = N (0,T Tt)=N (0,It).
The number of necessary parameters to be estimated can be found using (6.16).
We have K unknown eigenvalues {ηi}
K
i=1. Furthermore, we have KN -dimensional
eigenvectors {vi}
K
i=1 which gives an additional NK unknown parameters. These
eigenvectors {vi}
K
i=1 need to be orthonormal which leads to K (K +1 )/2 restrictions
as can be seen from Table 6.1. Using
number of parameters = degrees of freedom + number of restrictions (6.16)
we ﬁnd that the degrees of freedom equals NK − K (K +1 )/2. Adding the K
eigenvalues {ηi}
K
i=1 we have NK−K (K − 1)/2 parameters to estimate. Therefore,
by suitable rotation of Γ we can get a   Γ such that the ﬁrst K rows and columns
3The spectral decomposition can also be performed on the correlation matrix Ψ(K). This would
lead to diﬀerent eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The number of parameters that need to be estimated
is the same (see Basilevsky (1995)).6.4 Estimation of the models and numerical example 129
Table 6.1: Restrictions on the eigenvectors
Restrictions on the eigenvectors {vi}
K
i=1 of the spectral decomposition in (6.15).
v1 v2 ··· vK
v1  v1 
2 =1




. . . ...
vK v1 · vK =0 v2 · vK =0 ···  vK 
2 =1
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6.4 Estimation of the models and numerical ex-
ample
Since string models have been introduced only recently, there is some mysticism sur-
rounding them, in particular, the treatment and estimation of the covariance/correlation
matrix. We showed in Section 6.3 that the discrete string model is observationally
equivalent to the LMM. This implies that we can apply the same calibration tech-
niques for the discrete string model as for the LMM, which we brieﬂy outline below.
One starts by determining the covariance matrix Σ or correlation matrix Ψ and
volatilities σ of the log forward rates {Fi (T0)}
N
i=1 based on historical rates or cali-
bration to caps and swaptions. A common approach is to use principal components
analysis (PCA) (see Basilevsky (1995) for an in-depth discussion of PCA) in order
to determine the number of factors and estimation of the eigenvalues and eigenvec-
tors. The PCA can be done both on the covariance or correlation matrix. The LSS
papers and de Jong, Driessen and Pelsser (2002) capably illustrate this technique
empirically. Therefore, we provide some stylised examples to illustrate advantages
and disadvantages of both methods.130 Obs. Equivalence of Discrete String Models and Market Models
6.4.1 PCA on covariance matrix
We start from a two factor LMM speciﬁcation with correlated Wiener processes for
four six month forward LIBOR rates (K =2 ,N =4 ) ,
dFi (t)
Fi (t)
= σ1 exp(κ1 (Ti − t))dW
Qi+1
1 (t)+σ2 exp(κ2 (Ti − t))dW
Qi+1
2 (t),i =1 ,...,4,
(6.18)
with d[W1,W 2](t)=ρdt. As parameter values we take σ1 =0 .3, σ2 =1 .5, κ1 =
−0.1, κ2 = −4.0, and ρ = −0.6.
We rewrite the model in the set-up of (6.7) and derive the discrete string model









σ1 exp(0.5κ1) σ2 exp(0.5κ2)
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σ1 exp(κ1) σ2 exp(κ2)
σ1 exp(1.5κ1) σ2 exp(1.5κ2)










































For the discrete string model we have Σ
(2)
Σ =d i a g( σΣ)Ψ
(2)



























10 .7675 0.7178 0.7108
0.7675 1 0.9972 0.9964
0.7178 0.9972 1 1








If we would have done PCA for a two factor model on the correlation matrix in
the above example, we would have found exactly the same results, since we started6.4 Estimation of the models and numerical example 131
with an exact two factor speciﬁcation. In practice, however, one starts with an
estimated covariance matrix, which is usually of full rank, and wants to estimate a
K factor model on it. Then the results diﬀer in general in ﬁnite samples, though
they should converge if the data is generated from a true K-factor model.
6.4.2 PCA on correlation matrix
In our second example, we start with an estimated full rank covariance matrix Σ and
use PCA in order to determine the two-factor versions of the discrete string model
and the LMM. We do this for four six-month forward LIBOR rates (K =2 ,N =4 ) .
For ease of exposition, we have given an estimated correlation matrix, Ψ with Ψij =

























10 .800 0.640 0.512
0.800 1 0.800 0.640
0.640 0.8 0 010 .800



















Ψ (subscripts denote that the PCA is performed on Ψ). However, we
should note that Ψ
(2)
Ψ is not a proper correlation matrix in case K<N , since it










0.9319 0.8759 0.6680 0.4653
0.8759 0.8993 0.8067 0.6680
0.6680 0.8067 0.8993 0.8759







The covariance matrix Σ
(2)
Ψ resulting from Σ
(2)
Ψ =d i a g( σ)Ψ
(2)
Ψ diag(σ) is, however, a
4In practice, the diagonal elements are usually much closer to one, but we chose this stylised
example to emphasize the point of improper correlation matrices.132 Obs. Equivalence of Discrete String Models and Market Models
valid covariance matrix. Therefore, we can take Γ
(2)
Ψ =d i a g( σ)A
(2)

























Ψ =d i a g( σΨ)Ψ
(2)∗
Ψ diag(σΨ)w i t hΨ
(2)∗
Ψ a proper correlation



























10 .9767 0.8597 0.7300
0.9797 1 0.9493 0.8597
0.8597 0.9493 1 0.9767








Note that the two largest eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors of Ψ do not
match the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of Ψ
(2)∗
Ψ . As noted before, if the data on
which we estimate our K-factor model would be generated by a true K-factor model
they converge asymptotically. However, in ﬁnite samples the problem of an non-
proper Ψ
(2)
Ψ still exists. For this reason one might prefer to use the PCA on the
covariance matrix. On the other hand the PCA on the correlation matrix is preferred
from a numerical point of view, since it does not have scaling problems. In the
above example performing the PCA on the covariance matrix only gives marginally
diﬀerent results. For practical purposes we would advise to do both PCA on the
covariance and on the correlation matrix and compare the results. For some recent
work on optimal calibration of the covariance/correlation matrix of the LMM and
discrete string model, see, for example, Zhang and Wu (2001).
6.4.3 Numerical example
Since LIBOR market models and the discrete string model allow for Black-type
analytical formulas for the valuation of caplets (and ﬂoorlets), we illustrate that
both models result in the same prices for caplets. The Black formula for pricing of6.5 Conclusion 133



















T1 =0 .5 0.2305 0.2305 3,247.5 0.1255 0.1255 1,803.8
T2 =1 .0 0.2559 0.2559 5,090.8 0.1328 0.1328 2,719.5
T3 =1 .5 0.2560 0.2560 6,228.6 0.1422 0.1422 3,566.6
T4 =2 .0 0.2453 0.2453 6,885.7 0.1352 0.1352 3,880.2
caplets with strike κ is given by
cpli (t)=δiP (t,Ti+1)[Fi (t)Φ(d+) − κΦ(d−)] (6.24)
with
d± =
log(Fi (t)/κ) ± 1
2 (Ti − t)νi  
(Ti − t)νi
, (6.25)
where νi = σ2
i for the discrete string model and νi =  Γi 
2 for the LMM. In Table 6.2
we price 4 ATM caplets/ﬂoorlets (caplet and ﬂoorlet prices are the same for ATM
options) with for both examples a ﬂat initial term structure with Fi (T0)=0 .05,
i =1 ,...,4 and notional equal to one million.
6.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that discrete string models are observationally equiv-
alent to market models. We derive that the number of parameters needed for the
estimation these models equals NK−K (K − 1)/2. As a consequence of the obser-
vational equivalence discrete string models are a special case of the HJM framework.
The discrete string models can be estimated/calibrated using principal components
analysis in the same manner as the market models.Chapter 7
Factor Dependence and
Estimation Risk for Cap-Related
Interest Rate Exotics
7.1 Introduction
During the nineties we witnessed a spectacular growth of trading derivative in-
struments that continues in the new millennium. For example, the turnover of
exchange-traded ﬁnancial derivatives is estimated at about $ 192 trillion (see Jean-
neau (2002)). The notional amount of outstanding OTC contracts is estimated at
$ 128 trillion (see Jameson and Gadanecz (2003)) consisting for the larger part of
(short-term) interest rate products.
The two main liquid interest rate derivatives markets are the caps (ﬂoors) and
swaptions market. Though the largest part of derivatives traded in these markets
are the plain vanilla caps, ﬂoors, and swaptions there exists a sizable market in
more exotic products. These products can be traded separately or, as is often the
case, as part of a more complex structured deal. In either case these deals are
over-the-counter and not very liquid. Therefore, in these markets besides hedging
model risk also considerable pricing model risk can exist (see, for example, Hull and
Suo (2002)). Both for traders and for risk management divisions it is, therefore,
important to get an idea about the price range of the value of the exotic. In this
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chapter we investigate the estimation risk involved in pricing exotic interest rate
derivatives. Estimation risk can provide risk management divisions guidelines in
setting model reserves for the various products and traders about bid-ask spreads.
We adopt the popular Libor market model (see Brace et al. (1997), Miltersen
et al. (1997), and Jamshidian (1997)) for analyzing several cap related interest rate
exotics: deferred caps, autocaps, sticky caps, ratchet caps, and discrete barrier caps.
Contrary to ordinary caps, these products are sensitive to the joint distribution of
the forward rate term structure. In case of the Libor market model, this means the
speciﬁcation of the correlation matrix of the forward rates. In practice, this corre-
lation matrix is either estimated historically or calibrated to the swaption market
as swaptions are correlation sensitive liquid products. Unfortunately, the relation of
caps and swaptions markets remains somewhat unclear (see, for example, Longstaﬀ
et al. (2001a) and de Jong, Driessen and Pelsser (2001)). Calibration of the Libor
market model to swaption prices often results in unrealistically unstable correla-
tion matrices and thereby prices and especially sensitivities. Therefore, we adopt
historical correlation in this chapter.
The Libor market model can be speciﬁed in numerous ways. Among other things,
the number of factors needs to be speciﬁed. In this chapter we investigate to which
extent the cap related exotics are sensitive to the number of factors used in estimat-
ing the correlation matrix. We ﬁnd that the autocap, ratchet cap, and sticky caps
are very sensitive to the number of factors used. Furthermore, we investigate the
estimation risk in pricing the exotics. This is done using the stationary bootstrap of
Politis and Romano (1994) and the window length selection method of Politis and
White (2003). As one would expect, the prices of the correlation sensitive products
also contain a substantial degree of estimation risk.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section in-
troduces notation and reviews the Libor market model and discrete string model.
Section 7.3 describes the exotic derivatives investigated. Section 7.4 discusses the
bootstrap technique for determining estimation risk. Results are presented in Sec-
tion 7.5. Finally, Section 7.6 concludes.7.2 Notation and Models 137
7.2 Notation and Models
7.2.1 Notation
In this section we introduce notation necessary for the remainder and give a descrip-
tion of the Libor market model / Discrete string model. First, we deﬁne a ﬁnite set
of dates, the so-called tenor structure
t = T0 <T 1 <T 2 <...<T N+1. (7.1)
We indicate the current time by t and T1,...,TN+1 denote the forward tenor dates.
This gives a spot LIBOR rate (for [T0,T 1]) and N forward LIBOR rates from (for
[Ti,T i+1], i =1 ,...,N). We deﬁne δi = δ (Ti,T i+1) as the so-called daycount fractions
(for an extensive treatment on day-count fractions, see Miron and Swannell (1992)),
which are determined by the maturity of the LIBOR rate and are most often ap-
proximately equal to 3 or 6 months. Let the forward LIBOR rate from Ti to Ti+1 at
time t ≤ Ti be denoted by F (t,Ti,T i+1) which is deﬁned as







,t ≤ Ti and i =1 ,...,N, (7.2)
where D(t,T) denotes the value of a discount bond at time t with maturity T.F o r
notational convenience, we deﬁne Fi (t) ≡ F (t,Ti,T i+1).
7.2.2 Libor market model
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the Libor market model (introduced by Brace
et al. (1997), Miltersen et al. (1997), and Jamshidian (1997)). In Chapter 6 we have
shown that this model is observationally equivalent to the discrete string model
(introduced by Longstaﬀ et al. (2001b) and Longstaﬀ et al. (2001a)). The models
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(t)=ρi,jdt, i,j =1 ,...,N,
W M denotes an K-dimensional (K ≤ N) standard Wiener process and ρi,j denotes
the instantaneous correlation between Zi and Zj. The ﬁrst line, that is (7.3), cor-
responds to the discrete string model (DSM) setting, while the second line, that is
(7.4), corresponds to the Libor market model (LMM) setting. Due to absence-of-
arbitrage restrictions, αM
i =0i fM = Qi+1,t h eTi+1− forward martingale measure
associated with numeraire D(•,T i+1).
The covariance matrix (in DSM notation, and constant for notational conve-
















The forward rate dynamics of Fi given in (7.3) are easily generated using Monte-
Carlo methods under the Ti−forward martingale measure using an Euler method,
for all i. In the sequel we are interested in pricing derivatives that depend on
several forward rate settings, which complicates the pricing. Therefore, we want to
model the dynamics of all forward rates under one measure. Though in principle the
choice of measure is arbitrary, it is convenient to use the TN+1−forward measure,
also referred to as the terminal measure. Changing the measure from the Ti−forward









σk(t)ρi,k,i =1 ,...,N. (7.6)
Note that the dynamics now have a stochastic drift term, and therefore in an Euler
scheme the dynamics of the forward rates are no longer exact but for the last forward
rate. More advanced methods exist to approximate the stochastic drift term in (7.6),
such as the predictor-corrector method proposed in Hunter, J¨ ackel and Joshi (2001)7.3 Exotic interest rate derivatives 139
(see Kloeden and Platen (1999) for more general predictor-corrector methods) and
are employed in this chapter.
For the exotic derivatives treated in the sequel no analytical formula is available
in the Libor market model. In computing the prices several variance reduction
techniques can be applied. Since for caps and ﬂoors analytical prices are available,
these are used as control variates. Furthermore, antithetic variables are used.
7.3 Exotic interest rate derivatives
In this section we describe a number of commonly used cap related exotic interest
rate derivatives. For a more extensive list of interest rate exotics, see, for example,
Brigo and Mercurio (2001), Rebonato (2002), Pelsser (2000), and Hunt and Kennedy
(2000). For all products a unit notional amount is assumed.
7.3.1 Cap / ﬂoor
We start with the most basic instruments, caps and ﬂoors. A cap (ﬂoor) is portfolio
of options on LIBOR rates called caplets (ﬂoorlets). Caps (ﬂoors) provide protection
against high (low) interest rates. The payoﬀ of a caplet (ﬂoorlet) ﬁxing at Ti and
paying at Ti+1 is given by
Cpli(Ti+1)=δi (Fi(Ti) − κ)
+ (7.7)
Frli(Ti+1)=δi (κ − Fi(Ti))
+ . (7.8)
Choosing the discount bond maturing at Ti+1, D(Ti,Ti+ 1), as numeraire and work-
ing with the associated martingale measure (usually denoted as the Ti+1-forward

















0 denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the measure Qi+1
at time T0.140 Factor Dependence and Estimation Risk
In the LMM, where the forward LIBOR rates follow a lognormal distribution,
caplets and ﬂoorlets can be priced explicitly using the Black formula (see Black
(1976))
Cpli(T0)=δiD(T0,T i+1)(Fi(Ti)Φ(d+) − κΦ(d−)) (7.11)
Frli(T0)=δiD(T0,T i+1)(κΦ(−d−) − Fi(Ti)Φ(−d+)), (7.12)
















The standard cap / ﬂoor caplet / ﬂoorlet payment occur at their ”natural” times,
that is, one period after their setting. There also exist caps / ﬂoors in the market
for which all caplet / ﬂoorlet payments occur at the ﬁnal time, TN+1.W et e r mt h i s











Similar valuation formulas can be derived for deferred ﬂoors. We expect the deferred
cap / ﬂoor to be sensitive to the shape of the term structure. It should be slightly
sensitive to correlation (see correlation in the drift term in (7.6)), but probably not
too much.
7.3.3 Autocap
An autocap (autoﬂoor) is similar to an ordinary cap (ﬂoor), but the holder is only
allowed to exercise l ≤ N instead of the normal N caplets (ﬂoorlets). Furthermore,
the caplets (ﬂoorlets) must be exercised when they are in the money at a settlement


















I I(Fj(Tj) >κ ) ≤ l − 1
 
.
A similar formula can be derived for autoﬂoors. One should note that the {Ei}
N
i=1
not only depends on the current rate, but also on the previously observed spot Libor
rates, {Fn(Tn)}i
n=1.
7.3.4 Discrete barrier cap
A discrete barrier cap (ﬂoor) is similar to a standard cap (ﬂoor) with the diﬀerence
that the payoﬀ of its underlying caplets (ﬂoorlets) are conditional on the event that
previous spot Libor rates have or have not (depending on the type of barrier option)
hit a certain level, known as the barrier. Though more complex variants exist, we
consider discrete barrier caps where the barrier condition is only reviewed at ﬁxing
dates. The discrete barrier cap (ﬂoor) is characterized by a series of strikes, {κi}N
i=1,
and barriers, {Hi}N













I I(Fn(Tn) <H n)
 
. (7.16)
From (7.16) we see that caplet i only pays out in case all previous spot Libor rates,
{Fn(Tn)}i
n=1, are below their barriers. The discounted payoﬀ of a down-and-in



















Thus, a down-and-in discrete barrier caplet i pays out if at least one of the previous
spot Libor rates, {Fn(Tn)}i
n=1 was set below its barrier. A portfolio of an up and in
and an up and out barrier caplet equals an ordinary caplet. Combining the following
features: in/out, up/down, standard/digital and cap/ﬂoor results in sixteen diﬀerent
types of discrete (digital) barrier caps and ﬂoors.142 Factor Dependence and Estimation Risk
7.3.5 Ratchet cap
A ratchet option (also denoted a one-way ﬂoater) is similar to a standard cap/ﬂoor
with the diﬀerence that the strikes are variable over time and depend on settings of











where κ1 is given and for i>1
κi = κ(κi−1,...,κ1;Fi−1(Ti−1),...,F1(T1)). (7.19)
In the sequel we consider a ratchet option with as strike the spot Libor at the
previous setting
κi = Fi−1(Ti−1). (7.20)
Furthermore, we consider a sticky cap where the strike equals the minimum of the
spot Libor at the previous setting and the previous strike
κi = Fi−1(Ti−1) ∧ κi−1. (7.21)
Both the ratchet and the sticky cap are expected to be very sensitive to the corre-
lation matrix.
7.4 Estimation risk in the LMM
From the dynamics of the forward rates given in (7.3) and (7.4) combined with (7.6)
it is clear that the prices of the exotic derivatives treated in the previous section are
dependent on the volatility functions, {σi(t)}
N
i=1 and the correlation matrix, which
we denote by ρ. If we have an analytical pricing formula, say f, which is a function of
θ ≡ (σ1,...,σN,ρ 1,2,...,ρN−1,N) an application of the delta method (see, for example,
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where Σθ denotes the covariance matrix of θ. However, for the exotic derivatives
discussed in Section 7.3 no analytical formula is available and prices need to be
determined using numerical methods. In principle one could try to determine the
standard errors by numerically computing the partial derivatives of f, but this does
not look very attractive and it contains more information than needed.
A second and more promising method to get standard errors of the option prices
is using the bootstrap (see Efron (1979) for the original work). Loosely speaking,

















where ˆ θ∗ is estimated on a bootstrap sample of the original data. For the ordinary
bootstrap, a bootstrap sample is a sample drawn with replacement from the original
sample,{X1,...,XT},s a y ,{X∗
1,...,X∗
T} with the original sample length.1
A problem with the ordinary bootstrap is that it does not take time dependence
of the observations into account. A method that can take time-dependence into
account is the moving block bootstrap, where one draws blocks of observations
instead of single observations. This method can generate time dependence in the
data; however the bootstrap samples resulting from a moving block bootstrap are
not necessarily stationary even if the original data are. In case of the LMM the
(return) data are generated from a stationary process.2 An alternative method able
to take time dependence and stationarity into account is the stationary bootstrap
(see Politis and Romano (1994)). This method can be described as follows. First,
we randomly select a bootstrap observation X∗
1 from the original T observations.
Suppose that X∗
1 = Xj. The second bootstrap observation is then equal to Xj+1 with
probability 1−p; otherwise, it is picked at random from the original T observations,
where p is a given positive constant smaller than or equal to 1.3 Thus, having the ith
bootstrap observation X∗
i = Xi∗, we take the next bootstrap observation according
1One can also draw samples smaller than the original sample, in which case we speak of sub-
sampling (see Politis, Romano and Wolf (1999) for an excellent treatment.)
2Strictly speaking this only holds for a forward rate under its own forward martingale measure
due to the stochastic drift under a diﬀerent measure, but this eﬀect is minor.








Xi∗+1 with prob. 1 − p
a random draw from {X1,...,XT} with prob. p,
(7.24)
for i =1 ,...,T.
By applying the stationary bootstrap to our data of forward rates we can get
B bootstrap estimators ˆ θ∗,w h e r eB denotes the number of bootstraps. For each
bootstrap estimator ˆ θ∗ we can compute the prices of the exotic options using the
Monte-Carlo simulation method resulting in an estimator for standard errors of the
option prices. Using (7.22) conﬁdence intervals are easily constructed.
7.5 Results
We use the US forward curve from March 19, 1997 to May 14, 2003 on weekly basis
to estimate correlations. We investigate quarterly compounding cap products, as
these are the most liquid for the US market. First, we investigate which products are
most sensitive to the number of factors used. In case of a K factor model, we perform
principal components analysis (PCA) on the historical covariance matrix and set all
but the K largest eigenvalues equal to zero. From the resulting covariance matrix,
we compute the correlation matrix and transform this into the LMM covariance
matrix using the volatility term structure which can be calibrated to market prices
of caps.4 PCA can also be done on the correlation matrix (see, for example, Chapter
6 for an application to Libor market models and Basilevsky (1995) in general).
In Table 7.1 we present the prices in basis points of the various products using a
one factor LMM with a ﬂat term structure at 4% and a ﬂat volatility term structure
at 20%. Besides prices also simulation standard errors are given. Cap prices are
computed using the analytical Black formula and therefore do not contain simulation
error.
In Figure 7.1 we investigate the inﬂuence of the number of factors used in ﬁtting
the correlation matrix. We see that the deferred cap is as expected hardly sensitive
to correlation. The up-and-in barrier cap is somewhat sensitive to the number of
























Figure 7.1: Factor dependence
This ﬁgure gives the prices of the K−factor model relative to the one-factor model
for the deferred cap, autocap, sticky cap, ratchet cap, and up and in discrete barrier
cap. The term structure is assumed to be ﬂat at 4% and the volatility term structure
is assumed ﬂat to be at 20%. All products are ATM, the barrier for the up-and-in
barrier cap equals 5%, the start strike for the sticky cap and ratchet cap equals 4%
and the number of caps for the autocap equals half the number of settings. The
upper panel gives a 3 year deal and the lower panel a 5 year deal. The number of
simulations equals 10,000.146 Factor Dependence and Estimation Risk
Table 7.1: One factor model prices
This table gives the prices for the cap, deferred cap, autocap, sticky cap, ratchet
cap, and up-and-in barrier cap for a one factor Libor market model. The initial term
structure is ﬂat at 4% and the volatility term structure is ﬂat at 20%. The strike
for the deferred cap, autocap, sticky cap (initial strike), and ratchet cap (initial
strike) equals 4%. The barrier for the up and out barrier equals 5%. The number of












































































factors in the correlation matrix; prices computed using more than one factor are
between 90% and 100% of the one factor price. We ﬁnd that the sticky and ratchet
cap are rather sensitive to the number of factors, although in case of the sticky cap
the prices ﬂatten out after factor 4 at about 1.3 times the one-factor price. The
autocap is very sensitive to correlation matrix. Even for a small number of factors
prices are already up twice the one-factor price. However, for all products, one
should be careful when looking at high factor models as part of the correlation in
the correlation matrix is due to noise. It is quite likely that high factor models are
overﬁtting noise instead of “true” correlation.
In Figure 7.3 we also investigate the factor dependence of the various products,
this time with a hump shaped volatility term structure given in Figure 7.2. We ﬁnd
that in this case all products but the ratchet are less sensitive to the number of
factors used. Besides the ratchet, the autocap is most sensitive. However, in this
situation the autocap is valued higher with the one-factor model than the more than
one factor models.7.5 Results 147








Volatility term structure 
Figure 7.2: Hump shaped volatility term structure
This ﬁgure presents the hump shaped volatility term structure used for Figures
7.3 and 7.5. On the vertical axis the level of caplet volatility is given and on the
horizontal axis the time to maturity.
In order to compute the standard errors of the computed prices, we use the
stationary bootstrap with p =0 .1 (expected block size equals ten), where p was
determined using the automatic block size determination method of Politis and
White (2003) on spot Libor rates. For each bootstrap sample we compute the LMM
covariance matrix using PCA as described above. In Figures 7.4 and 7.5 we present
the relative prices of the autocap, sticky cap, ratchet cap, and up-and-in barrier cap
with their 95% conﬁdence intervals. Results of the deferred cap are not shown as
it has hardly any estimation risk. We clearly see that, in case one uses a model
with more than one factor, estimation risk can be considerable. Furthermore, we
see that for all but the up-and-in barrier cap the conﬁdence regions grow with the
number of factors, but as expected the growth rate decreases with the number of
factors. We see that for the up-and-in barrier option the price range computed using
two factors more or less covers all prices computed by higher factor models and one
might be inclined to conclude that two factors suﬃce in pricing the up-and-in barrier.
However, risk management divisions are advised to set a model reserve larger than
or equal to the worst-case limit of the price range (depending on whether the bank
is on the buy or sell side, this is the upper or lower conﬁdence limit). For autocaps
and sticky caps, the price range given by the 5 factor model more or less covers the
prices computed by the higher factor models. For the ratchet cap things are not so

























Figure 7.3: Factor dependence hump shaped volatility
This ﬁgure gives the prices of the K−factor model (number of factors on the hor-
izontal axis) relative to the one-factor model for the deferred cap, autocap, sticky
cap, ratchet cap, and up and in discrete barrier cap. The term structure is assumed
to be ﬂat at 4% and the volatility term structure is assumed hump shaped. All
products are ATM, the barrier for the up-and-in barrier cap equals 5%, the start
strike for the sticky cap and ratchet cap equals 4% and the number of caps for the
autocap equals half the number of settings. The upper panel gives a 3 year deal and





















up&in barrier cap 
Figure 7.4: Estimation risk
This ﬁgure gives the prices of the K−factor model (number of factors on the horizon-
tal axis) relative to the one-factor model including the 95% conﬁdence regions. The
term structure is assumed ﬂat at 4% and the volatility term structure is assumed
ﬂat at 20%. All products are ATM, the barrier for the up-and-in barrier cap equals
5%, the start strike for the sticky cap and ratchet cap equals 4% and the number of
caps for the autocap equals half the number of settings. The upper panels present
t h er e s u l t so fa3y e a rd e a la n dt h el o w e rp a n e l sp r e s e n tt h er e s u l t so fa5y e a rd e a l .























1.000 up&in barrier cap 
Figure 7.5: Estimation risk hump shaped volatility
This ﬁgure gives the prices of the K−factor model (number of factors on the hori-
zontal axis) relative to the one-factor model including the 95% conﬁdence regions.
The term structure is assumed ﬂat at 4% and the volatility term structure is as-
sumed to be hump shaped. All products are ATM, the barrier for the up-and-in
barrier cap equals 5%, the start strike for the sticky cap and ratchet cap equals 4%
and the number of caps for the autocap equals half the number of settings. The
upper panels present the results of a 3 year deal and the lower panels present the
results of a 5 year deal. The number of simulations equals 10,000.7.6 Conclusions 151
7.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we provide a method to take estimation risk into account when
computing exotic interest rate derivatives prices. This provides traders and risk
managers with a price range of values for the exotic product contrary to a sin-
gle estimate. We ﬁnd that this estimation risk is very much product dependent.
Autocaps, sticky caps, and especially ratchet caps are very sensitive to correlation
resulting in considerable standard errors for the products. For some products risk
managers are advised to set reserves up to the price of the product.Chapter 8
Conclusions and Directions for
Further Research
8.1 Summary and conclusions
Since the mid nineties the quantitative risk management literature surged. The ﬁrst
part of this thesis adds to that literature from both a theoretical and empirical point
of view on model risk.
In Chapter 2 we introduce a backtest framework for, among other things, the
most popular risk measurement methods, value-at-risk and expected shortfall. We
provide ample simulation evidence that for appropriately adjusted levels (in case of
the Gaussian distribution this means that a 1% value-at-risk about equals a 2.5%
expected shortfall) our expected shortfall test has equal size, but considerably bet-
ter power. Since the probability of detecting a misspeciﬁed model is higher for a
given value of the test statistic, this allows the regulator to set lower multiplica-
tion factors. We suggested a scheme for determining multiplication factors. This
scheme results in less severe penalties for the backtest based on expected shortfall
compared to backtests based on value-at-risk, and compared to the current Basel
Accord backtesting scheme in case the test incorrectly rejects the model. Therefore,
we conclude that the prospects for setting up viable capital determination schemes
based on expected shortfall are promising.
In Chapter 3 we apply the backtest framework set out in Chapter 2 to positions
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containing derivatives. Where value-at-risk can be tested using a binomial test, this
is not the case for expected shortfall and we need information of the distribution in
the tail. By nature, the characteristics of derivatives positions change over time. To
overcome this problem, we present a transformation procedure. We tested several
risk management models for computing expected shortfall and value-at-risk for one-
period hedge errors of hedged derivatives positions. We found that the practically
popular method of historical simulation provides the reasonably accurate estimates
of the risk of a derivative portfolio.
Chapter 4 presents a model risk measurement framework. Our framework ex-
tends the (market) risk framework set out by Artzner et al. (1999) and Delbaen
(2000) by considering risk measurement methods for a class of models instead of
a risk measure for one particular model. This allows for a quantiﬁcation of model
risk on top of market risk measurement. This allows regulators to set capital re-
quirements for trading activities in a market, based on the extent to which this
market can be reliably modeled. The general framework presented is elaborated
in such a manner that it ﬁts well into the capital adequacy framework set out by
the Basel Committee and that of many internal risk management divisions. Our
results suggest that, for commonly used models, a Gaussian and a GARCH(1,1)
model, misspeciﬁcation risk dominates estimation risk. The analysis indicates that
the multiplication factor set by the BIS is conservative if it would only be intended
to cover model risk.
In Chapter 5 we have empirically investigated the model risk associated with
writing plain vanilla straddles in the S&P 500 equity derivatives market and the
$/£, £/,a n dt h e$ / FX derivatives markets. We found that in our samples for
the S&P 500 market considerable estimation and misspeciﬁcation risk is present.
Estimation risk is found to be signiﬁcant for all products, while misspeciﬁcation risk
is signiﬁcant for all three months options. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that in the S&P
500 market a risk premium is demanded for bearing the misspeciﬁcation risk and
this premium increases towards the end of our sample. For the FX markets we also
ﬁnd substantial misspeciﬁcation risk, which is found to be statistically signiﬁcant
for the $/ and £/ markets. Interestingly, in our sample there does not appear
to be a risk premium for bearing the misspeciﬁcation risk.8.2 Directions for Further Research 155
In the second part of the thesis we investigate some models and products in the
interest rate derivatives markets. Chapter 6 refutes a claim by Longstaﬀ et al.(2001a,
2001b) that their discrete string model is more parsimonious than the Libor market
model. It is shown that discrete string models are observationally equivalent to
market models. We derive that the number of parameters needed for the estimation
these models equals NK − K (K − 1)/2i nc a s eo fN Libor rates and a K−factor
model. As a consequence of the observational equivalence discrete string models are
a special case of the HJM framework.
Chapter 7 investigates the factor dependence and estimation risk for some com-
monly used exotic interest rate derivatives. We suggest the (stationary) bootstrap
for computing the estimation risk for the exotics. We ﬁnd that autocaps, sticky caps,
and ratchet caps are sensitive to the number of factors used and have considerable
estimation risk.
8.2 Directions for Further Research
The research conducted in this thesis can be extended in various ways. The discus-
sion between value-at-risk and expected shortfall addressed in Chapters 2 to 4 can
be continued by investigating both capital requirement schemes in market crises;
which method has the most prevention power? Furthermore, more empirical evi-
dence is needed to identify the extent to which markets can be reliably modeled for
diﬀerent markets.
In order to investigate the model risk of writing derivatives one can investigate
more advance option pricing models such as, for example, stochastic volatility mod-
els. Furthermore, alternative hedge strategies can be conducted. An important
property of hedge strategies related to model risk is robustness. Exposure to model
risk can be reduced by use of robust hedging strategies. A hedging strategy is called
“robust” if it performs well under a wide range of model assumptions. For example,
if a bank does not want any exposure to model risk for a certain type of derivative
it can get rid oﬀ the model risk by selling the security (we abstract here from credit
risk). However, such a hedge, a perfect static hedge, is rarely possible in practice
and banks need to rely on quasi-static and dynamic hedges. In general one expects156 Conclusions and Directions for Further Research
that the performance of a hedging strategy will depend on how far reality is from
the nominal model that has served as a basis for the construction of the strategy.
A hedging strategy that is designed for a particular model cannot be expected to
do well in a world that is totally diﬀerent from the model assumptions. Therefore,
robustness has to be measured in terms of performance degradation with respect
to models that are in some sense close to the nominal one. The value-at-risk and
expected shortfall measures used in this thesis could serve the role of a distance
measure for the degradation in performance.
Obviously the choice of instruments to be used in hedging plays an important
role. In cases in which there is a fairly wide choice of possible hedging instruments,
such as in the ﬁxed-income markets, one may optimize for robustness of the hedging
strategies over the various possible choices of instruments. Using, for instance, value-
at-risk or expected shortfall as distance measures, one can deﬁne a strategy to be
“optimally robust” with respect to a certain tolerance if it optimizes the performance
that it guarantees over the set of models that lie within the speciﬁed tolerance (in
the sense of the chosen distance measure) of a nominal model.
Often, model parameters are calibrated on the basis of observed prices rather
than estimated from historical data. There are several ways in which the study of
robust hedging is connected to calibration. Robustness studies could help to iden-
tify the model parameters that are critical to hedge performance and that therefore
must be determined accurately. Even more importantly perhaps, robustness con-
siderations may lead to adaptations in pricing models and will in this way have an
impact on calibration.
Most of the suggestions for further research addressed above can be investigated
both from a theoretical and empirical point of view. However, a number of ﬁnancial
markets are not mature enough (for example, the strongly growing and important
credit derivatives market) to provide enough data for empirical analysis. Finding
relevant sets of alternative models for these markets poses an interesting challenge.Bibliography
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Gedurende de laatste decennia zijn we getuige geweest van een toenemende com-
plexiteit van producten in de ﬁnanci¨ ele markten. Dit heeft ertoe geleid dat ﬁnanci¨ ele
instellingen steeds meer gebruik zijn gaan maken van kwantitatieve modellen. Naast
een toenemende complexiteit, is ook de omvang van de ﬁnanciele markten spectac-
ulair toegenomen.
De groeiende complexiteit en handelsvolume van ﬁnanci¨ ele markten maakt de
taak voor regulerende instanties lastiger en belangrijker. Dezer dagen bestaat de
portefeuille van een bank ook voor een groot gedeelte uit afgeleide instrumenten
(derivaten) wiens waarde afhangt van traditionelere instrumenten zoals aandelen,
obligaties, en wisselkoersen, maar ook exotischere onderliggende waarden zoals volatiliteit
en kredietrisico. Een van de meest in het oog springende verschillen tussen derivaten
en de meer fundamentele waarden, zoals aandelen en obligaties, is het belang van
theoretische waarderingsmodellen. Deze modellen worden gebruikt om het gedrag
van de rentetermijnstructuur, volatiliteitstermijnstructuur, aandelen, etc te voor-
spellen. Hierdoor wordt een nieuw soort risico ge¨ ıntroduceerd; modelrisico.
Hoewel modelrisico het meest prominent is in derivatenmarkten is het zeker niet
beperkt tot derivatenmarkten. Zo gebruiken risicomanagers allerlei modellen om
(neerwaartse) risicomaten te berekenen om het risico van portefeuilles in te schat-
ten. Ze gebruiken modellen die de dynamiek van de portefeuille moeten beschrijven.
Indien deze modellen de dynamiek niet accuraat beschrijven volgt een troebele in-
schatting van het risico. Deze inschatting is van belang voor de bank zelf, alsmede
voor de regelgevers die op basis ervan de reserves voor een bank bepalen. Met
behulp van een kwaliteitstoets wordt de kwaliteit van het model onderzocht en
afhankelijk van de resultaten wordt de reserve berekend. In hoofdstuk 2 presenteren
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we een raamwerk voor deze kwaliteitstoetsen. Dit raamwerk is toepasbaar op alle
hedendaags populaire risicomaatstaven. Het geeft een vergelijking tussen de value-
at-risk, de huidige risicomaatstaf van het Basel akkoord, en expected shortfall, de
in de academische literatuur populaire tegenhanger. We vinden dat de kwaliteit
van modellen gebruikt voor het bepalen van expected shortfall beter gemeten kan
worden dan die van modellen voor het bepalen van value-at-risk.
Hoofdstuk 3 gebruikt het raamwerk van hoofdstuk 2 om het risico van porte-
feuilles met derivaten te bepalen. Het behandelt met name het probleem dat
derivatenportefeuilles van samenstelling veranderen over de tijd zonder dat de porte-
feuille wordt aangepast, aangezien looptijd en moneyness over de tijd veranderen.
Benaderingsformules worden bepaald waardoor derivatenportefeuilles in het raamw-
erk van hoofdstuk 2 kunnen worden geplaatst.
Handelaren zijn zich wel degelijk bewust van het feit dat de modellen die ze
gebruiken niet geheel correct zijn en proberen ze aan te passen aan de marktsituatie.
Zo gebruiken ze nog steeds overvloedig het Black-Scholes model ondanks dat de
gebreken van dit model veelvuldig zijn aangetoond. Met vuistregels gebaseerd op
marktkennis bereiken ze echter bevredigende resultaten.
Risicomanagers zijn in het algemeen verder van de markt verwijderd en moeilijker
is staat subjectieve correcties aan modellen te maken. Daardoor is modelrisico voor
risicomanagers wat lastiger te interpreteren en kwantiﬁceren dan de traditionele
risicos, zoals marktrisico, kredietrisico, etc. Een mogelijke oplossing is het zetten van
modelreserves voor handelaren. Idealiter zijn deze modelreserves afhankelijk van de
markt en het product dat verhandeld wordt, aangezien sommige markten/producten
gemakkelijker te modelleren zijn dan anderen. In hoofdstuk 4 presenteren we een
raamwerk voor de kwantiﬁcering van modelrisico. Het raamwerk is gebaseerd op het
berekenen van een risicomaatstaf in een slechtst mogelijk geval in een verzameling
van modellen in de buurt van een referentiemodel. Het maakt een opslitsing tussen
schattingsrisico en misspeciﬁcatierisico. In de behandelde empirische toepassing
blijkt het misspeciﬁcatierisico veel belangrijker dan het schattingsrisico.
Met de toenemende liquiditeit van optiemarkten is het prijzen van standaardpro-
ducten, zoals call- en putopties, niet echt meer een uitdaging. Door marktprijzen op
een handige manier te interpoleren kan al gauw een goede inschatting voor een stan-Nederlandse Samenvatting 167
daardproduct gevonden worden. Het modelrisico van het prijzen van derivaten is
daardoor te verwaarlozen (dit is niet het geval voor exotische derivaten, wat in hoofd-
stuk 7 aan de orde komt). De risico’s van de standaardproducten moeten echter ook
worden afgedekt en de resultaten hiervan hangen af van de risicoafdekkingsstrate-
gie. In hoofdstuk 5 bekijken we empirisch het modelrisico van risicoafdekken. We
bestuderen de S&P 500, en de belangrijkste wisselkoersen. We gebuiken hiervoor
de bootstraptechniek en beargumenteren waarom deze te preferen is boven de tot
nu toe gebruikte techniek van historische simulatie. We vinden ook hier dat het
misspeciﬁcatierisico aanzienlijk is.
In hoofdstuk 6 laten we zien dat 2 modellen, het libor marktmodel en het dis-
crete stringmodel, die tot nu toe als verschillend werden verondersteld eigenlijk het-
zelfde zijn. Deze modellen dienen dus voor risicomanagementdoeleinden als gelijk
te worden behandeld. Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt de factorafhankelijkheid en het schat-
tingsrisico van deze modellen voor het waarderen van exotische producten. Het laat
zien dat het modelrisico voor het prijzen van derivaten zeker niet te verwaarlozen is
voor exotische derivaten.   
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